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INTRODUCTION 
Our founding fathers faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, 
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a 
charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still 
light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s 
sake.2 
This is a time for reflection, not retribution. . . . We have been 
through a dark and painful chapter in our history. But at a time of 
great challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by 
spending our time and energy laying blame for the past.3 
President Obama’s 2009 inauguration speech emphasized the 
fundamental nature of America’s commitment to human rights and 
the rule of law in the country’s self-perception as an idealistic and 
inspirational society, where the rights of all are protected. Within the 
United States, such political rhetoric has long highlighted the nation’s 
 
2 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all). 
3 Press Release, The White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of 
OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office 
/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos) [hereinafter OLC 
Press Release]. 
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potential to inspire other countries towards greater protection of 
individual rights. Despite America’s much discussed tendency 
towards “exceptionalism” with regard to the jurisdiction of 
international law towards U.S. citizenry,4 this rhetorical commitment 
has been substantiated by the leadership role that the United States 
has played in the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and 
transitional justice5 around the world. For example, it has provided 
enormous financial, logistical, and technical support to the work of 
international and hybrid courts in Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and Cambodia.6 
Indeed, according to Schabas, “[s]ince international criminal justice 
first became truly operational, in 1945, it has had no greater friend or 
promoter than the United States.”7 Through these actions, the United 
States has demonstrated support for legal accountability for human 
rights violations perpetrated by foreign warlords, dictators, and their 
foot soldiers. In addition, through the rule of law programs of 
agencies such as the U.S. State Department, the United States has 
provided considerable financial, personnel, and logistical resources to 
building rule of law capacity within numerous countries around the 
world.8 It has also contributed to the rule of law at the international 
 
4 American exceptionalism has been written about extensively by legal scholars, as well 
as researchers from other disciplines. See, e.g., AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN L. 
REV. 1479 (2003). Part IV.B. explores in more detail the cultural and political aspects of 
American exceptionalism. 
5 There is no universally accepted definition of transitional justice, but the phrase refers 
to a field of research and praxis that explores how states that are transitioning from conflict 
and repression can address legacies of mass violence. See Anne-Marie La Rosa & Xavier 
Philippe, Transitional Justice, in POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: A LEXICON 368 
(Vincent Chetail ed., 2009); Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding 
After Mass Violence, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009), for an analysis of 
transitional justice institutions and objectives. 
6 For example, the U.S. State Department 2011 budget for supporting transitional 
justice was $55,000,000. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY: FISCAL 
YEAR 2012, available at http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/156214.pdf; see also 
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS (2004); Annie Bird, Comparing Cases of US Involvement in Transitional Justice 
(Aug. 2011) (presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference), available at 
http://www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/180.pdf. 
7 William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s 
All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 702 (2004). 
8 A review of recent press releases on the State Department website indicates the 
breadth of the department’s work in this area. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, 
Governance and Rule of Law: Two Year Fast Fact on the U.S. Government’s Work in  
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level through its leadership role in organizations such as the United 
Nations.9 
However, as has been extensively scrutinized in recent years, the 
lackluster pursuit of accountability for the widespread abuses 
committed by American personnel during the so-called “War on 
Terror”10 illustrates a disjuncture within domestic and international 
discourse between the dual perceptions of the United States as a law-
abiding nation and America as a law-breaking state. This article seeks 
to explore this disjuncture through investigating the rationales of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for limiting accountability for the 
widespread torture of detainees by CIA interrogators. The author 
acknowledges that this focus excludes other abuses, such as those 
committed against Iraqi and Afghani civilians by the U.S. military, 
which are liable for prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.11 It also excludes the liability of other actors implicated in 
 
Haiti (Dec. 28, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rls/179739.htm; Press 
Release), U.S. State Dep’t, Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan (May 4, 2012), available 
at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm); Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, Further 
Collaboration on Rule of Law Development in Moldova (May 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/190513.htm); Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, 
Pakistan Rule of Law (Nov. 23, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs 
/177705.htm). 
9 See United States Legal Counselor On Justice and the Rule of Law, Remarks at a 
Security Council Debate on Justice and the Rule of Law (June 29, 2010), available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/06/30/justice-and-the-rule-of-law/. 
10 AMNESTY INT’L, USA: SEE NO EVIL 26 (2011). Amnesty International has 
contended that “impunity and leniency [have] been the hallmark of the USA’s response to 
abuses.” Id. at 31. To date, criminal accountability for detainee abuse within the U.S. has 
been characterized as “abysmal” by Human Rights Watch. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE MISTREATMENT 
OF DETAINEES 6 (2011). 
11 As with the crimes of CIA interrogators, there has been impunity for crimes 
committed by military personnel. For example, a 2006 report authored jointly by three 
organizations documented “over 330 cases in which U.S. military and civilian personnel 
are credibly alleged to have abused or killed detainees . . . involv[ing] more than 600 U.S. 
personnel and over 460 detainees.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST AND 
THE NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, BY THE NUMBERS: FINDINGS OF THE DETAINEE ABUSE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 2 (2006). Of the U.S. personnel identified, only fifty-four 
military personnel had been convicted, forty of whom had been imprisoned, and only ten 
of these sentences had been for more than one year. Id. at 24. The report further found that 
only half of the cases identified had been adequately investigated. Furthermore, the 
highest-ranking officer prosecuted for the abuse of prisoners was a lieutenant colonel, 
Steven Jordan, court-martialed in 2006 for his role in the Abu Ghraib scandal, but 
acquitted in 2007. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 6. In addition, in the 2010 
Universal Periodic Review of the United States’ human rights record by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council, several American and international human rights organizations made 
submissions denouncing the lack of accountability for prisoner abuse. See U.N. Human  
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prisoner abuse including contractors, government lawyers, and 
political officials as these groups are subject to distinct accountability 
requirements. It focuses on the CIA’s participation in coercive 
interrogations because, despite the domestic and international legal 
prohibitions on torture, these crimes have been subject to the greatest 
official effort to ensure impunity for the perpetrators. 
To explain why the United States has pursued only limited 
accountability for prisoner abuse, this article begins in Section II by 
providing an overview of the nature and extent of the prisoner abuse, 
its relationship to domestic and international prohibitions on torture, 
and the efforts by the Bush administration to avoid respecting these 
prohibitions. In Section III, the article explores the domestic law 
governing the federal government’s use of leniency for political 
offenses through pardon, amnesty, legislative immunity, and 
prosecutorial discretion. Given the international dimensions of the 
prisoner abuse scandal, this section will also explore the unilateral 
and multilateral involvement of the United States in the decisions of 
foreign governments to enact amnesty laws. Section IV examines the 
decisions of the DOJ not to pursue prosecutions for prisoner abuse in 
some detail by analyzing extensive data relating to the United States’ 
enactment of domestic amnesty laws and pardons, and its 
involvement in foreign amnesty negotiations. These examples of 
America’s attitudes towards amnesty laws are used to contextualize 
the current debates, and explain the decisions not to prosecute in light 
of America’s previous use of leniency for political offenses. That 
analysis is grouped under the following themes: amnesty, empire, and 
hegemony; amnesty, denial, and justificatory claimsmaking; law, 
politics, and pragmatism in the use of amnesties; and amnesty, mercy, 
and the public welfare. 
In analyzing American attitudes to amnesty laws, this article will 
draw on two overlapping datasets. Firstly, for domestic amnesties and 
pardons, the author has compiled a dataset of the texts of the relevant 
presidential proclamations. The universe of cases includes all the 
domestic amnesty laws since independence. In addition to amnesties, 
each president typically pardons a broad cross-section of offenders,12 
and a small number of these federal pardons are included in this 
dataset where the motivations, recipients, and/or offenses involved 
 
Rights Council, Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/3/Rev.1 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
12 See, e.g., JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009). 
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could be considered “political.” This dataset focused only on political 
pardons because, as this article will explore, many of the decisions to 
grant pardons in these cases faced similar political risks and rewards 
as the decisions not to pursue prosecutions for prisoner abuse. The 
selection of the political pardons included in the analysis is drawn 
from a review of the literature. The author acknowledges, however, 
that other “political” pardons may have been issued but have not been 
identified for inclusion, either because they have not been subject to 
extensive academic scrutiny or due to the subjectivity that can exist 
when distinguishing “criminal” from “political” offenses.13 The 
amnesties and pardons contained in this dataset are listed in Appendix 
1. 
Secondly, for the analysis of American engagement with foreign 
amnesty laws, this article will draw upon the Amnesty Law Database 
constructed by the author. This database compiles data on amnesties 
in all parts of the world that have been enacted since the end of the 
Second World War in response to conflict, repression and political 
transition. At the time of writing, the Amnesty Law Database contains 
information on 537 amnesty laws in 129 countries that were 
introduced between 1945 and June 2011.14 This article will use the 
database to identify and analyze instances where the United States has 
engaged with amnesties in other countries, either by acting 
unilaterally or through multilateral organizations. In compiling the 
information on U.S. state practice, the Amnesty Law Database 
collates a variety of materials, including U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, State Department press statements, newspaper articles, 
and academic writings. The cases identified will only paint a partial 
picture, however, due to the difficulties of accessing detailed 
information on American involvement in negotiations, particularly for 
earlier amnesty laws, when many of the political agreements would 
have been negotiated behind closed doors. 
The article will argue that although amnesties and pardons are 
products of and regulated by law, their use creates exceptions to the 
law that are motivated by a range of inter-related political concerns, 
 
13 See, for example, LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL 
Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide 135–44 (2008), for a discussion of the 
inclusion of political offenses in leniency measures. 
14 See Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Global Accountability Norm? 
Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment, in AMNESTY IN 
THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 69, 79 (Leigh A. Payne & Francesca Lessa eds., 2012); MALLINDER, supra 
note 13, for further information on the Amnesty Law Database. 
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such as power, sovereignty, legitimacy, and national security. These 
concerns have been evident in America’s historical engagement with 
amnesty laws and continue to be central to contemporary debates on 
accountability for prisoner abuse. 
I 
LAW AND TORTURE IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
The “coercive interrogation” strategies15 developed by the Bush 
administration to question terror suspects in the wake of September 
11, 2001, have become the source of much controversy, both within 
the United States and internationally.16 According to the abundant 
documentation that has become available, it is now established that 
thousands of foreign prisoners in U.S. detention were routinely 
subjected to a range of repressive interrogation techniques, which in 
some cases resulted in the deaths of prisoners.17 The techniques 
included waterboarding, stress positions, beatings, wall-slamming, 
and choking.18 In addition, prisoners were subjected to forced nudity, 
extended sleep deprivation and isolation, mock executions, religious 
and sexually degrading treatment, and threats to torture, rape, or kill 
detainees or their families.19 Interrogations were carried out by U.S. 
military personnel, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogators, 
 
15 See ABU GHRAIB: THE POLITICS OF TORTURE (Meron Benvenisti et al. eds., 2004); 
MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2004); LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, GUANTANAMO AND ITS 
AFTERMATH: U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
FORMER DETAINEES (2008); K.J. GREENBERG & J.L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS 
(2005); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND (2004); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. 
Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (2004), for a 
detailed discussion of the rationales, development, and nature of the “coercive 
interrogation” strategies. 
16 This ongoing contestation was apparent in debates resulting from the information 
released by Wikileaks showing that U.S. officials were aware of prisoner abuse in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. See, e.g., Phil Stewart, WikiLeaks Show U.S. Failed to Probe Iraqi Abuse 
Cases: Reports, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2010. In addition, it was visible in the debates on 
whether information obtained through coercive interrogation permitted the U.S. authorities 
to locate and assassinate Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Bin Laden Dead, 
Torture Debate Lives On, NEW YORKER, May 2, 2011. 
17 The exact number of detainees who died because of coercive interrogation is 
unknown, but by 2005 a U.S. Army report noted that 108 persons had died in U.S. 
custody. See Report: 108 Died in U.S. Custody, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-244_162-680658.html. 
18 CAROLYN PATTY BLUM, LISA MAGARREL & MARIEKE WIERDA, PROSECUTING 
ABUSES OF DETAINEES IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS 3 (2009). 
19 Id. 
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and private military contractors, and were sanctioned by the highest 
levels of government.20 
The severity and systematic nature of the coercive interrogation 
practices arguably violated America’s obligations under international 
and domestic law. Torture is prohibited in international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, 
which compositely regulate the treatment of prisoners by the United 
States during its military occupation of Iraq, its conflict-related 
activities within other states, and even its actions outside conflict.21 
Within international criminal law, torture has been recognized as a 
crime by the Convention Against Torture. Under this Convention, 
where a State official is accused of torture, the State party is required 
to investigate the facts, and if appropriate, “submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution” or extradite the 
suspect.22 Under international humanitarian law, all four Geneva 
Conventions relating to international armed conflicts and occupation 
state that “torture or inhuman treatment” and “willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health” are “grave breaches,” 
which require states to prosecute or extradite suspects accused of 
these crimes.23 In addition, under Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions, relating to non-international armed conflicts, 
“mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” breach the 
minimum standards that state parties must respect.24 Finally, the main 
international and regional human rights conventions recognize 
freedom from “torture or [from] cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment” as a non-derogable human right.25 For all 
three branches of international law, freedom from torture is an 
absolute right that cannot be limited or restricted in conflict or other 
times of “public emergency which threaten[] the life of the nation.”26 
 
20 In his memoir, former President George W. Bush recalled that when asked by CIA 
Director George Tenet to approve the waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he 
responded “[d]amn right.” GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 170 (2010). 
21 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War 
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006). 
22 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
23 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
24 Id. at art. 3. 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
26 Id. at art. 4. 
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These bodies of law can trigger different oversight mechanisms, 
ranging from human rights treaty monitoring institutions that hold 
states accountable for violating human rights conventions, to 
international courts or courts in third states that can pursue individual 
criminal responsibility for torture. 
Within the American legal tradition international law is often 
viewed as having a subsidiary status to domestic law. However, the 
international prohibition on torture is reflected in domestic law. For 
example, the Torture Statute criminalizes torture committed by U.S. 
citizens overseas and creates obligations to investigate and punish 
those responsible, with possible sentences of life imprisonment or 
death.27 In addition, the War Crimes Act of 1996 defines war crimes 
as grave breaches and violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, including torture where either the victim or the 
perpetrator is a U.S. national or member of the U.S. military forces.28 
It imposes similar penalties to the Torture Statute. 
Historically, state sovereignty meant that executive governments in 
all countries had considerable discretion on whether to prosecute 
serious human rights violations committed within their borders. 
However, the growth of international law and its incorporation into 
American domestic law meant that, by 2002, the Bush administration 
became concerned that by ordering coercive interrogation techniques, 
it could expose its officials to serious legal penalties before domestic 
and international courts.29 As a result, the government pursued 
various strategies to prevent this, beginning by trying to conceal these 
practices through extraordinary renditions30 and the “juridical 
othering” of terrorist suspects.31 It addition, it tried to obfuscate the 
legal status of coercive interrogation techniques, through the now 
 
27 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340 (West 2012) (“torture statute”). 
28 Id. at § 2441. 
29 KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS 
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 191–92 (2011). 
30 See, for example, Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against 
Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2002); 
Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War 
on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2006); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2005), for 
detailed discussion of extraordinary renditions. 
31 See Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering, 
45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005). This article explores the concept of juridical 
othering as processes by which there are efforts to define “individuals or groups as 
juridical others to whom normal rules do not apply,” by for example using terminology 
such as unlawful combatant. Id. at 517. 
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infamous “torture memos.”32 These memos, which continue to 
provide the justification for not pursuing prosecutions in the majority 
of cases of prisoner abuse, were a series of initially classified 
documents drafted by government lawyers working within the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The first memos, 
drafted in January 2002, argued that under the American constitution, 
the U.S. President had the authority to “suspend” the application of 
the Geneva Conventions to prisoners who were labeled as “enemy 
combatants,” rather than prisoners of war. This argument was 
designed to reduce the scope for prosecution not just under the 
Geneva Conventions, but also under the War Crimes Act of 1996.33 
A further memo dated August 1, 2002, and authored by Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, sought to undermine the applicability 
of the international prohibition of torture within U.S. law. It argued 
that U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture do not 
apply to acts committed outside U.S. territory; that torture constitutes 
only acts specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering; and 
that the doctrine of necessity could supersede national or international 
laws prohibiting torture.34 Further memos and letters produced by the 
OLC detailed what were deemed to be acceptable forms of coercive 
interrogation.35 
The reasoning contained in the torture memos was unpersuasive for 
military lawyers and legal advisers in the State Department, and “[b]y 
2005, a clear consensus was starting to emerge among jurists that the 
memos were faulty as a matter of law, and would not hold up under 
international legal scrutiny.”36 The Bush administration responded to 
these concerns by seeking to ensure legislative immunity for state 
officials engaged in coercive interrogations through the Detainee 
 
32 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS 181-200 (2010); see also DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE POLITICS OF 
PRISONER ABUSE: THE UNITED STATES AND ENEMY PRISONERS AFTER 9/11, 60–94 
(2011), for an analysis of the role of the government lawyers in providing legal cover for 
the practices of coercive interrogation. See also Ross L. Weiner, Note, The Office of Legal 
Counsel and Torture: The Law as Both a Sword and Shield, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 524 
(2008), for a description and analysis of the memos. 
33 Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 321, 343 (2009); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture 
Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389 (2005). 
34 Scharf, supra note 33, at 344–45. 
35 See DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 
(2009) (interpreting the torture memos); see also David Cole, The Torture Memos: The 
Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2009). 
36 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 206. 
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Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Treatment Act of 2006, which 
will be explored below. In short, following September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration sought to establish a legal regime under which 
serious crimes were perpetrated systematically by state officials 
across numerous locations and against large numbers of individuals. 
During his initial months in office, President Obama was sensitive 
to the opposition that had developed to coercive interrogation. For 
example, soon after his inauguration he took a number of measures to 
end the policy, including stopping extraordinary renditions, closing 
“Black Sites” where the CIA conducted clandestine interrogations, 
declaring null and void legal memos issued by the Bush 
administration, and forbidding the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques.37 These policies did not extend, however, to closing the 
Guantánamo detention center or trying terrorist suspects in civilian 
courts rather than military commissions.38 Furthermore, the 
administration has consistently been reluctant to pursue investigations 
and prosecutions for prisoner abuse. Instead, as the next section will 
explore, two prosecutorial decisions were taken to prevent 
prosecutions for the majority of CIA interrogators. To the extent that 
these decisions have granted impunity for torture, they can be 
compared to the use of amnesties and pardons. 
II 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF AMERICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH 
AMNESTIES 
This section will explore America’s power to grant leniency 
domestically. In addition, as Section IV will supplement the 
consideration of domestic amnesties with data relating to American 
attitudes to amnesty laws enacted abroad, this section will also 
consider America’s ability to engage in debates on amnesty laws 
around the world. 
A. Leniency for Political Offenses Within U.S. Domestic Law 
This discussion will explore the following forms of domestic 
leniency for political offenses: pardon, amnesty, legislative immunity, 
and prosecutorial discretion. While these are clearly not the sole 
 
37 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
38 See Kenneth Roth, Empty Promises? Obama’s Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights, 
89 FOREIGN AFF. 10, 11 (2010), for a discussion of the failures of the Obama 
administration to substantially change the executive policies on human rights. 
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forms of leniency that are available to domestic politicians and legal 
professionals,39 they have been selected here as they have all been 
used to grant leniency for offenders responsible for political offenses, 
either in America’s past or as a result of prisoner abuse. This section 
will contrast how these forms of leniency are understood within 
scholarly literature and U.S. practice, and it will analyze the legal 
basis for their use. 
1. Presidential Pardons 
Legal scholars generally define pardons as “acts of legal leniency 
that remove only the consequences but not the prospect of adverse 
court proceedings.”40 This means that pardons are granted to 
individuals who have been convicted to release them from all or part 
of their sentence. However, within the United States, pardoning 
powers are broader than this definition. 
Following American independence from British colonial rule,41 the 
power to grant pardons initially resided with the states.42 However, at 
the 1787 Constitution Convention, the power to pardon federal crimes 
was included in the Constitution and vested in the President.43 States 
retained the power to pardon offenses under state laws.44 Among the 
main lobbyists for the creation of the federal pardon power was 
 
39 Other forms of leniency commonly used within the American criminal justice system 
include statutes of limitations, plea agreements, sentence reductions, and the use of 
immunity. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 213, 217, 221, 227, 229 (West Supp. 2000 & 
Supp. 2012). 
40 MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 14 
(2009). 
41 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 585–90 (1991), for a discussion of the power to 
pardon under British colonial rule. 
42 Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal 
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 204 (1999). 
43 Id. at 205. 
44 As Krug notes “[f]ifty-two jurisdictions—the federal government, each of the fifty 
states, and the District of Colombia—are competent to enact their own criminal laws and 
laws of criminal procedure, and to establish their own criminal justice systems. . . . [M]ost 
criminal laws are those of the states, and the vast majority of criminal cases are prosecuted 
by the state and local authorities.” Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 644 (2002) (footnote omitted). State pardoning powers remain 
significant and play a major role in the U.S. criminal justice process, but they are beyond 
the scope of this article. The delimitation of the pardon power between the federal and 
state-level governments is reviewed at length in Kobil. Kobil, supra note 41. See also 
LARRY N. GERSTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION (2007); 
ALISON  L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010); W. 
W. Thornton, Pardon and Amnesty, 6 CRIM. L. MAG 457 (1885), for a more general 
discussion of the powers of the state within the U.S. federalist system. 
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Alexander Hamilton,45 who argued that “in seasons of insurrection or 
rebellion there are often critical moments when a well timed offer of 
pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the 
commonwealth.”46 As will be explored below, pardons and amnesties 
were soon used in the way that Hamilton suggested within the United 
States. For other supporters of the pardon power, its inclusion was 
necessary to introduce an element of flexibility into an otherwise rigid 
criminal justice system.47 For domestic pardons, both these rationales 
have become less pressing, as the federal government now faces 
substantially fewer challenges to its authority than in the early 
decades of the Union, and greater discretion has been introduced at all 
stages of the criminal justice process. As a result, presidential pardons 
for all types of federal offenses (and indeed, state pardons for 
violations of state law) are used far less often today.48 
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides 
“[The President] shall have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.”49 This power has been interpreted broadly to enable 
the President to pardon any crime, with the exception of 
impeachment50 or offenses under state laws. To obtain a pardon, 
individual recipients must consent to being pardoned, with admissions 
of guilt being viewed as consent. Although during and after the Civil 
War Congress sought to restrict the President’s power to pardon,51 in 
 
45 William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 501 (1977). 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 339 (Alexander Hamilton) (Pa. State Univ. ed., 2001). 
47 Duker, supra note 45, at 502–03. 
48 See Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on 
the President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1484 (2000). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833), 
for a definition of pardons. 
50 The extent to which this exception prevents presidents pardoning themselves for 
criminal acts committed before or during their term of office is unclear. According to Nida 
and Spiro, the administrations of President Richard Nixon (for Watergate) and President 
George Bush Sr. (for the Iran-Contra Affair) both considered issuing self-pardons. See 
Nida & Spiro, supra note 42. 
51 See JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND 
JOHNSON: THE RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 
1861–98 (1953); Duker, supra note 45, at 475, for an overview of these struggles between 
Congress and the President. It should also be noted that during the Civil War, Congress 
itself issued amnesties, and during later debates on an amnesty for Vietnam-era draft 
dodgers and deserters, there was some discussion of whether Congress was empowered to 
issue amnesty laws. See Harrop A. Freeman, An Historical Justification and Legal Basis 
for Amnesty Today, L. & SOC. ORD. 515, 529 (1971). 
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the 1866 Ex Parte Garland case, the Supreme Court found the power 
to be “unlimited.”52 It continued by interpreting its effects broadly: 
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence 
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases 
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the 
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never 
committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any 
of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from 
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and 
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as 
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.53 
This Supreme Court judgment underscores the fact that pardons with 
U.S. law differ from understandings of the notion of pardon within 
the international academic literature on pardons in a number of 
respects. In particular, in the U.S. context, pardons can be granted 
before as well as after conviction. Though the Constitution does not 
explicitly mention amnesty laws, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the pardon power to include the ability to grant amnesties, as will be 
discussed below. 
2. Amnesties 
Developing a general definition of an amnesty law is problematic 
as within national legal systems, the term “amnesty” may be defined 
differently, and different bodies may be empowered to grant 
amnesties.54 Furthermore, no accepted definition has yet been 
developed within international law. As a result, the scope and legal 
effects of amnesty laws around the world can look very different. 
However, Mark Freeman has developed a broad and useful definition 
of an amnesty law as: 
[A]n extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to 
remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability for 
designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated 
types of offenses irrespective of whether the persons concerned 
have been tried for such offences in a court of law.55 
This definition illustrates that amnesties are typically distinguished 
from pardons in that they can apply pre-conviction. However, this 
 
52 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
53 Id. at 380–81. 
54 See René Lévy, Pardons and Amnesties as Policy Instruments in Contemporary 
France, 36 CRIME & JUST. 551 (2007). 
55 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 13. 
2012] Power, Pragmatism and Prisoner Abuse: 321 
Amnesty and Accountability in the United States 
distinction is not so pronounced within the United States, where 
pardons can be granted pre-conviction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, when interpreting amnesties as falling 
within the presidential pardon power, has explored the distinction 
between the two forms of leniency within U.S. law. For example, in 
1877, Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Knote v. United States, wrote: 
Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be made, between 
pardon and amnesty. It is sometimes said that the latter operates as 
an extinction of the offense of which it is the object, causing it to be 
forgotten, so far as the public interests are concerned, whilst the 
former only operates to remove the penalties of the offense. This 
distinction is not, however, recognized in our law. The Constitution 
does not use the word ‘amnesty;’ and, except that the term is 
generally employed where pardon is extended to whole classes or 
communities, instead of individuals, the distinction between them is 
one rather of philological interest than of legal importance.56 
Since independence, successive presidents have issued amnesty 
laws and pardons for American citizens who have refused to adhere to 
federal laws. As illustrated in Appendix 1, the dataset compiled for 
this research on U.S. domestic practice has identified forty-three 
amnesties and pardons for political offenses enacted between 1795 
and 1999. However, as will be explored below, since the 1990s, 
national sovereignty to grant amnesty for serious human rights 
violations has been eroded by the growth of international human 
rights law and international criminal law. As a result, when seeking to 
protect its armed forces and intelligence personnel from prosecution, 
the Bush administration turned to other mechanisms to deliver 
immunity. 
3. Legislative Immunity and “Pseudo” Amnesties 
As amnesty laws are generally intended to achieve political 
objectives such as encouraging rebels to surrender and abide by 
national laws, the stated goal of granting amnesty is often clearly 
expressed in the legislation. However, where states seek to grant 
immunity for human rights violations or for crimes committed by the 
state itself, often such states try to avoid criticism by concealing that 
they are in fact granting an amnesty. Such measures can be 
characterized as “pseudo amnesties,” which Freeman defines as “legal 
measures that have the same juridical effect as amnesties but are 
 
56 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1877). 
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drafted in a disguised form and given titles that explicitly omit the 
word amnesty.”57 Arguably, such “pseudo” amnesties have been used 
within the United States to grant legislative immunity to U.S. 
personnel implicated in prisoner abuse through the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 was initiated by John McCain 
and other members of Congress responding to allegations of prisoner 
abuse. The Act was originally designed to prohibit and prevent such 
abuse. However, it was bitterly resisted by the Bush administration, 
which eventually had language inserted into the legislation that 
granted immunity to U.S. personnel engaged in interrogations.58 
Section 1004(a) of the Act states “[i]n any civil action or criminal 
prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed 
Forces, or other agent of the United States Government” who engaged 
in the interrogation of terror detainees and who 
were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time 
that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not 
know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would not know the practices were 
unlawful. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an 
important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a 
person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the 
practices to be unlawful.59 
The inclusion of this section was intended to “circumvent” the 
prohibitions on the mistreatment of detainees in sections 1002 and 
1003 of the Act.60 It implicitly provides that where U.S. personnel 
acted within the parameters outlined in the torture memos, they would 
be deemed to be unaware that their actions were unlawful, even 
though the memos had deliberately sought to reinterpret the law to 
limit prosecutions.61 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court found in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that the military commissions that had been established to try “enemy 
combatants” violated the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
 
57 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
58 Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 257, 
257–58 (2006). 
59 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 101–104, 119 Stat. 2680 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
60 Suleman, supra note 58, at 264. 
61 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 207. 
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the Geneva Conventions of 1949.62 Although this case did not relate 
to the policy of coercive interrogations, the decision nonetheless 
prompted the Bush administration to enact the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006.63 Section 5 provided that: 
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols 
thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to 
which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, 
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is 
a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its 
States or territories.64 
This provision has been criticized as creating further impunity for 
prisoner abuse by blocking detainees’ access to U.S. courts.65 In 
addition, Section 6 of this act revised the War Crimes Act of 1996 to 
amend the definition of war crimes with retroactive effect. These 
changes narrowed the definition of “cruel and inhuman treatment” 
and eliminated the crime of “outrages upon personal dignity, 
particularly humiliating and degrading treatment.”66 Matheson 
contends that as U.S. military personnel remained liable under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, these changes primarily benefited 
civilian officials and CIA personnel.67 The changes have been 
described as providing “amnesty to any violation of Common Article 
 
62 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624–25 (2006); see generally JONATHAN 
MAHLER, THE CHALLENGE: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE FIGHT OVER PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER (2008); Regina Fitzpatrick, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Implications for the Geneva 
Conventions, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 339 (2007); Mathew Happold, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
and the Law of War, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 418 (2007); Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
601 (2007). 
63 See Julia Y. Capozzi, Note, Hamdan v Rumsfeld: A Short Lived Decision? 28 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1303 (2006); Jill K. Lamson, Comment, Hamdan v Rumsfeld and the 
Government’s Response: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and its Implications on 
the Separation of Powers, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 497 (2008). 
64 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(emphasis added). This provision was not amended by the Military Commissions Act of 
2009. 
65 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 10, 18 (2007). 
66 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6. This did not, however, change liability 
for murder and torture. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 49. 
67 Michael J. Matheson, The Amendment of the War Crimes Act, 101 AMER. J. INT’L L. 
48, 52 (2007). 
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3 . . . that does not rise to the level of MCA-specified ‘grave 
breaches.’”68 
The provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 cannot be considered—strictly 
speaking—amnesty laws, but their effects are similar to those of an 
amnesty, as they are designed to shield individuals from prosecution 
for crimes they have committed. Their provisions decriminalized 
several forms of abusive treatment and created an assumption that 
officials implicated in acts of torture were doing so on the 
understanding that their actions were lawful. This assumption has 
been adopted by the Department of Justice in justifying its first 
decision not to prosecute. 
4. Decisions Not to Prosecute and “De Facto” Amnesties 
Decisions not to prosecute can be taken at many points within a 
criminal justice system. As discussed above, the United States, like 
other countries, empowers both the executive and the legislature to 
enact measures to restrict prosecutions. Beyond these formal acts of 
clemency, immunity can arise from actors within the criminal justice 
system, such as prosecutors, deciding to refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction. Even in cases where prosecution would be clearly 
justified, most legal systems allow for selectivity in the identification 
of persons against whom the law will be enforced and in the charges 
to be brought. As Cryer notes, “[s]elective enforcement of the law is 
not inherently wrong,” particularly since no criminal justice system 
has the capacity to prosecute all offenses.69 Therefore, “the question is 
not whether selective prosecution should occur . . . but when selective 
enforcement is unacceptable.”70 
Today it is widely recognized that American prosecutors have 
substantial discretion,71 which may be exercised for a wide range of 
reasons. Sarat and Clarke distinguish between decisions made by 
prosecutors on “predictions about success” based on the availability 
of sufficient evidence and witnesses, and decisions concerning the 
 
68 Arsalan M. Suleman, Military Commissions Act of 2006, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
325, 335 (2007); cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva 
Conventions and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 92 (2007). 
69 Robert Cryer, Selectivity in International Criminal Law, in BUILDING PEACE IN 
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS 153, 153 (Faria Medjouba ed., 2012). 
70 Id. at 154. 
71 Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 389 (2008). 
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“desirability and appropriateness” of prosecution.72 They argue that 
the second type of decision can be influenced by a wide range of 
exceptional factors, which do not necessarily “derive from legal 
norms,” nor correspond to the viability of the prosecution.73 Indeed, 
as Sarat and Clarke note, “[l]ike executive power in times of 
emergency or clemency, these decisions bring us to law’s limit.”74 
Prosecutorial discretion within the United States is thus “broad” 
and “generally unregulated” by the courts.75 However, the Department 
of Justice has developed the Principles of Federal Prosecution to 
guide federal prosecutors towards objective decision-making when 
exercising discretion. The principles recognize that prosecutors can 
exercise discretion at all stages of criminal prosecution; however, this 
section will focus on decisions to decline prosecutions that would 
otherwise be viable.76 The principles permit federal prosecutors to 
decline “because no substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution,” and they identify several grounds to justify such 
decisions.77 For example, prosecutors are encouraged to consider “the 
actual or potential impact of the offense on the community,” which 
can include economic harms; physical danger to citizens or public 
property; or the “erosion of the inhabitants’ peace of mind and sense 
of security.”78 In addition, prosecutors may consider “what the public 
attitude is toward prosecution under the circumstances of the case,” 
but that “public interest . . . should not be used to justify a decision to 
prosecute, or to take other action, that cannot be supported on other 
grounds.”79 As will be explored below, both public opinion and the 
impact of coercive interrogation on public security have featured 
prominently within debates on the desirability of pursuing 
accountability for prisoner abuse. 
 
72 Id. at 391. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Krug, supra note 44, at 643; see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007). 
76 The Principles of Federal Prosecution note the following moments in which 
prosecutors can exercise discretion: initiating and declining prosecution, selecting charges, 
entering into plea agreements, opposing offers to plead nolo contendere, entering into non-
prosecution agreements in return for cooperation, and participating in sentencing. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.000, available at http://www 
.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm. 
77 Id. at § 9-27.230 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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The principles also encourage federal prosecutors to consider the 
economic, physical, and psychological impact of the offense on the 
victim. The crime of torture is widely recognized as creating profound 
and long-lasting harms for victims,80 which under these principles 
would seem to indicate that federal prosecutors should, where the 
evidence permits, err in favor of prosecution. The principles also note 
that where the accused “occupied a position of trust or responsibility 
which he/she violated in committing the offense, [this] might weigh 
in favor of prosecution.”81 Therefore, for official personnel 
committing acts of torture, this provision also seems to guide federal 
prosecutors towards pursuing prosecutions. 
When federal prosecutors decline prosecution, the principles state 
that the prosecutor should “ensure that his/her decision and the 
reasons therefore are communicated to the investigating agency 
involved and to any other interested agency, and are reflected in the 
office files.”82 However, there is no obligation that the reasons for the 
decision be communicated to victims or the public.83 The principles 
are non-binding and do not “require a particular prosecutorial 
decision in any given case.”84 Adherence to the standards can only be 
enforced internally within the DOJ, and Podgor has found perhaps 
unsurprisingly that prosecutors “do not always adhere to these 
guidelines.”85 The absence of public reasons for the decisions 
arguably results in a lack of transparency and accountability. The 
obvious danger is that prosecutors may appear to decline prosecution 
for arbitrary or self-serving reasons, such as shielding perpetrators of 
serious crimes from public scrutiny, or succumbing to political 
 
80 See, e.g., MANU ACTIS ET AL., THAT INFERNO: CONVERSATIONS OF FIVE WOMEN 
SURVIVORS OF AN ARGENTINE TORTURE CAMP (2006); TORTURE: A COLLECTION 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Gabriela Fried, Piecing Memories Together After State 
Terror and Policies of Oblivion in Uruguay: The Female Political Prisoner’s Testimonial 
Project (1997–2004), 12 SOC. IDENTITIES 543 (2006); Derrick Silove, The Psychosocial 
Effects of Torture, Mass Human Rights Violations, and Refugee Trauma: Toward an 
Integrated Conceptual Framework, 187 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 200 (1999). 
81 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 76, at § 9-27.230. 
82 Id. at § 9-27.270. 
83 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 71, at 392. See also MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, 
PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 82 (2009), for a 
discussion of the need for prosecutions to justify their decisions not to pursue prosecutions 
in cases where there is a prima facie case. 
84 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 76, at § 9-27.120. Podgor describes the 
principles as “policy statements and not legislative rules.” Ellen S. Podgor, Department of 
Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
167, 169 (2004). 
85 Podgor, supra note 84, at 169. 
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pressure. It can also be problematic where there is a “conflict of 
interest” resulting in DOJ lawyers investigating crimes that were 
sanctioned by the Department, as was the case with the torture 
memos.86 
The absence of prosecution where it results from an active decision 
not to prosecute made for arbitrary reasons can be interpreted as a “de 
facto” amnesty, where it creates “a situation in which there is 
impunity in practice, notwithstanding the absence of a legally-enacted 
amnesty law.”87 Impunity has been defined in the U.N.’s Principles to 
Combat Impunity as “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of 
bringing the perpetrators of violations to account—whether in 
criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings.”88 As the 
decisions taken by the DOJ in 2009 and 2011 not to prosecute CIA 
personnel for prisoner abuse where taken in the absence of any 
alternative forms of accountability,89 they appear to fall within this 
definition of impunity, and hence could be considered “de facto” 
amnesties. 
Although President Obama signed an Executive Order repudiating 
the legal advice in the torture memos,90 in its first decision not to 
prosecute, the DOJ relied on them to justify its decision. On April 16, 
2009, the DOJ announced that “intelligence community officials who 
acted reasonably and relied in good faith on authoritative legal advice 
from the Justice Department that their conduct was lawful, and 
conformed their conduct to that advice, would not face federal 
prosecutions for that conduct.”91 The DOJ further stated that it had 
informed the CIA that the government would provide free legal 
 
86 David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the       
-torture-memos-the-case-against-the-lawyers/?pagination=false. 
87 FREEMAN, supra note 40, at 17. 
88 Comm. on Human Rights, Econ. and Soc. Council, Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity 6 (2005). 
89 There have been some attempts by victims of prisoner abuse to sue U.S. state 
officials for torture. However, U.S. federal courts held that torture fell within the “scope of 
employment” of federal officials and is hence subject to the absolute immunity doctrine. 
See, e.g., Rasul v Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All 
in a Day’s Work? Scope of Empoyment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human 
Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 198–
99 (2008). 
90 Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 37. 
91 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Four Office of Legal 
Counsel Opinions (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009 
/April/09-ag-356.html. 
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representation to all employees accused of prisoner abuse in domestic, 
international or foreign courts, or congressional investigations, and 
would indemnify employees for any financial penalties they 
incurred.92 In justifying such strong support for intelligence personnel 
who had acted within the parameters of the torture memos, the 
Attorney General proclaimed that “[i]t would be unfair to prosecute 
dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct 
that was sanctioned in advance by the Justice Department.”93 This 
decision left open the possibility for prosecution for those 
interrogators who exceeded the guidance in the memos. 
The exception from liability based on the torture memos was 
challenged on July 29, 2009, when the DOJ’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) released a report describing the memos as 
containing “seriously flawed arguments” and not constituting 
“thorough, objective or candid legal advice.”94 On this basis, the OPR 
report recommended that the DOJ “review certain declinations of 
prosecution regarding incidents of detainee abuse.”95 This suggests 
that even where CIA personnel acted according to the torture memos, 
there may be grounds to reopen investigations against them. The 
Attorney General responded by announcing in August 2009 that he 
was appointing a special prosecutor to conduct “a preliminary review 
into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the 
interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.”96 In his 
statement, despite the OPR’s recommendations, he reiterated that the 
review would not focus on those who had acted under the advice in 
the OLC memos, but would instead only focus on those who had 
exceeded it. 
Based on the two-year “preliminary review,” which investigated 
the treatment by CIA interrogators of 101 prisoners, on June 30, 2011, 
the Attorney General announced full criminal investigations were 
warranted in only two cases relating to deaths in custody.97 The 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF. RESP., INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON 
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 226 (2009). 
95 Id. at 261. 
96 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a 
Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0908241.html. 
97 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General Regarding 
Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (June 30, 2011), available at  
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announcement did not provide any details on the nearly 100 cases 
where the investigations had been dropped and it was not clear 
whether they related to any deaths in detention.98 
Given the severity of these abuses and the official status of those 
alleged to be responsible, the DOJ’s decisions not to prosecute seem 
to deviate from its Principles of Federal Prosecution and have been 
characterized as granting impunity to those responsible for ordering, 
perpetrating and providing legal validation for prisoner abuse.99 As 
such, they can be viewed as “de facto” amnesty for crimes committed 
by U.S. personnel against non-nationals. As the following section will 
explore, the United States has also at times been willing to support 
foreign amnesties for crimes committed by non-U.S. nationals. 
B. America, International Law, and Foreign Amnesties 
As noted above, unlike many exercises of leniency within the 
United States, the abuse of prisoners by CIA personnel is not purely a 
matter of domestic law. Torture is criminalized by international law 
that is binding on the United States, the victims were foreign 
nationals, and most of the crimes were committed outside American 
territory. This means that international legal requirements on amnesty 
and the duty to prosecute serious crimes are applicable to debates on 
the extent to which prosecutions have been pursued for prisoner 
abuse. Therefore, to evaluate America’s attitude towards amnesty 
laws, it is necessary to examine not only domestic practice, but also 
the United States’ international engagement with amnesties. 
Until recent decades, amnesty laws were primarily viewed as 
exercises of state sovereignty that were largely unrestrained by 
international law, but international actors regularly became involved 
 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/June/11-ag-861.html. In his statement, the Attorney 
General did not identify the two cases that will be investigated, but it has been reported 
that one case concerns Gul Rahman, who froze to death in 2002 after being stripped and 
shackled to a cold cement floor in a secret American prison in Afghanistan known as the 
Salt Pit. See Marjorie Cohn, Avoiding Impunity: The Need to Broaden Torture 
Prosecutions, JURIST (July 8, 2011), available at http://jurist.org /forum/2011/07/marjorie 
-cohn-torture-investigation.php. The other case is reported to concern Manadel al-Jamadi, 
who died in 2003 at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He was suspended from the ceiling by his 
wrists, which were bound behind his back. See id. On June 16, 2011, the U.S. Department 
of Justice opened a grand jury investigation in the death of Manadel al-Jamadi. U.S. Opens 
Grand Jury on CIA Detainee’s Death, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (June 16, 2011). 
98 Eric Lichtblau & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Widens Inquiries Into 2 Jail Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A1. 
99 Cohn, supra note 97. 
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in mediating and implementing foreign amnesties. Since the late 
1990s, three distinct legal regimes—international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, and international criminal law—have 
arguably evolved to impose some restrictions on the ability of states 
to grant amnesties for crimes under international law.100 At present, 
none of these regimes explicitly prohibits amnesties. The restrictions 
must therefore “be ‘read into’ a unified narrative of what the 
differentiated regimes collectively require.”101 For crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts, such interpretations are reliant on customary international 
law.102 
Under the Charming Betsy doctrine, U.S. courts are required, 
wherever possible, to construe national statutes to “be consistent with 
international law so as to avoid interpretations that will give rise to 
international discord.”103 The absence of international restrictions on 
national amnesty laws until the late 1990s meant that previously, U.S. 
enactment of amnesties or legislated support for foreign amnesties 
rarely risked conflicting with its international obligations. However, 
under the Charming Betsy doctrine, the evolutions in the duty to 
prosecute require U.S. courts to impose greater scrutiny on national 
legalization that conflicts with this duty. 
As has been extensively explored in academic literature, America’s 
relationship to international law, and particularly to international 
 
100 CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX 
PACIFICATORIA 243 (2008); see also FREEMAN, supra note 40; OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW-TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: 
AMNESTIES, HR/PUB/09/1 (2009); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second 
Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283 (2007); Louise Mallinder, Peacebuilding, the Rule 
of Law and the Duty to Prosecute: What Role Remains for Amnesties?, in BUILDING 
PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 9 (Faria Medjouba ed., 2012). 
101 BELL, supra note 100, at 249. 
102 Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute requires that 
determinations of whether such a duty to prosecute exists under customary international 
law must be based on state practice and opinio juris. The ICJ Statute also provides that 
judicial decisions and academic research can be ‘subsidiary’ sources of international 
custom. At present, some subsidiary sources strongly support the existence of the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity and serious violations committed in non-international 
armed conflicts. However, State practice appears much less supportive of such a duty. See 
Mallinder, supra note 100, for a more detailed discussion of the status of amnesty laws 
under customary international law. 
103 Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and 
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1352 (2006). In its judgment, the 
Supreme Court held “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations, if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
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treaties, is often described as “exceptionalist.”104 For example, 
Ignatieff has identified the American habit of “support[ing] 
multilateral agreements and regimes, but only if they permit 
exemptions for American citizens or U.S. practices.”105 This has been 
evident in U.S. engagement with international legal regimes, such as 
the International Criminal Court, that could result in foreign 
prosecutions of U.S. nationals.106 This exceptionalism suggests that 
American attitudes to crimes committed by foreign nationals against 
foreign victims will not translate neatly onto the attitudes that may 
motivate domestic legal and policy decisions on leniency for crimes 
committed by U.S. personnel. Nonetheless, where the United States 
has called for, endorsed, or assisted in the implementation of foreign 
amnesties, it does reveal that although America may support 
accountability and rule of law programs around the world, in certain 
contexts and for certain crimes, it feels that amnesty may be necessary 
and permissible. Consequently, this section will consider unilateral 
pressure applied by the United States on other states in relation to 
amnesties, and its engagement in amnesty negotiations through 
participation in multilateral institutions. 
1. Unilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
As the author has explored elsewhere,107 within conflicted or 
transitional states, domestic debates on whether to enact amnesty laws 
are often subject to international scrutiny and involvement. This 
involvement can come through international actors proposing that an 
amnesty be introduced; mediating peace negotiations that result in an 
 
104 Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 433 (2009); see also Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by 
our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to 
Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89 (2007); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification 
of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000), for a discussion of 
U.S. ratifications of human rights treaties. 
105  AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 4. 
106 See, e.g., Giovanni Conso, The Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of 
the Negotiating History of the Rome Statute, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 314 (2005); M.E. 
Lantto, The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Permanent Divide, 31 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 619 (2007); Gerhard Hafner, An Attempt to Explain the 
Position of the USA Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 323 (2005); Schabas, supra 
note 7; Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 93 (1999). 
107 MALLINDER, supra note 13, at 323–59. 
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amnesty;108 providing technical assistance during the drafting of 
amnesty legislation; or granting financial, logistical, or technical 
support to the amnesty’s implementation.109 At each of these stages, 
international support or opposition to an amnesty can be expressed 
through diplomatic, economic, legal, and military means. For 
individual states, involvement in foreign amnesties is often 
inconsistent with the result that the same state may endorse an 
amnesty in one country, while criticizing or failing to respond to a 
similar amnesty in another state. Furthermore, even within a state, 
different parts of the government may take divergent approaches. For 
example, during the later years of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress 
tried to condition aid to South American countries on their protection 
of human rights, whilst the U.S. armed forces and the CIA trained and 
supported amnesties for groups involved in perpetrating human rights 
violations in the region.110 
Within the Amnesty Law Database, data has been collated on 
American unilateral involvement in twenty-nine amnesty laws 
enacted between 1977 and 2011. These amnesty laws ranged from 
amnesties for serious human rights violations to amnesties for 
political dissidents. This involvement has been categorized into 
diplomatic, economic, legal and military actions, and one amnesty 
process may have triggered multiple forms of involvement. As noted 
in the introduction, the author does not suggest that this data is 
comprehensive; but nonetheless, as summarized in Table 1, it does 
indicate some trends in U.S. involvement. 
  
 
108 See Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy 
of International Conflict Management, 37 J. PEACE RES. 145 (2000); SAMUEL FLAGG 
BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), for discussions of 
America’s role as a mediator. 
109 For example, in January 2012, the U.S. State Department urged that an amnesty be 
granted to the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although the amnesty was 
condemned by the U.N., the U.S. State Department spokesperson stated: “This is part and 
parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be 
able to move forward towards a democratic future.” United States Defends Immunity Law 
for Yemeni President Saleh, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/10/us-backs-yemen-immunity-for-saleh. This 
amnesty was approved by the Yemeni Parliament on January 21, 2012, and President 
Saleh arrived in the United States on January 26, 2012, a few weeks before he was due to 
formally step down. See Tim Fitzsimons, Amnesty Plan for Yemen President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh Supported by US, GLOBAL POST (Washington), Jan. 10, 2012; Sebastian Smith, 
Yemen’s President Saleh Arrives in US for Treatment, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 29, 
2012. 
110 CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
JUSTICE VS PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION 26 (2004). 
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Table 1. American Unilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
 For Against 
Diplomatic 18 5 
Economic 4 2 
Legal 3 1 
Military 6 0 
Total 31 8 
As will be explored in Part IV, U.S. unilateral action has at times 
focused on encouraging the negotiating parties to enact broad, 
unconditional amnesties that encompass the most serious human 
rights violations, which Trumbull has interpreted as suggesting a 
belief among U.S. government officials that amnesties do not violate 
customary international law.111 In contrast, in other contexts, the 
United States has pressured the negotiators to exclude the most 
serious crimes from amnesty laws112 and to pursue prosecutions for 
human rights violations.113 Overall, however, Table 1 indicates that 
where the United States has become actively involved in foreign 
amnesty processes, through exercising diplomatic, legal, financial, or 
military pressure, it has been considerably more likely to encourage 
or coerce states to enact amnesty laws than to withhold them. The 
global military and economic dominance of the United States makes it 
difficult for weak, conflicted, or transitional states to resist such 
pressure.114 American involvement in the amnesty decisions of other 
states can have significant consequences, not just for the states in 
question, but also for the development of international law as state 
practice can shape the emergence of customary international law in 
relation to amnesties for violations of international offenses. 
 
111 Trumbull, supra note 100, at 297. Trumbull makes this argument in relation to all 
third-party negotiation, rather than just U.S. diplomatic interventions. 
112 For example, in 1996 international mediators in Guatemala, including the United 
States, lobbied against the enactment of a blanket amnesty law, see Douglass Cassel, 
Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for 
Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 202 (1996). 
113 For example, Cassel highlights that acting “under Congressional pressure, the U.S. 
has at times used aid leverage to insist on prosecution of particular human rights cases in 
such countries as Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.” Id. at 207. 
114 See, e.g., infra text accompanying n.151 (discussing the Haitian amnesty process). 
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2. Multilateral Involvement in Foreign Amnesties 
The United States can also influence foreign amnesty decisions 
through its participation in multilateral institutions, notably as a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).115 The 
Security Council is the world’s “central site of law-making and law-
enforcement in matters related to peace and security,” and through 
participation in it, its permanent members, including the United 
States, can “control it much more easily than the typical processes of 
international lawmaking and [-]enforcement.”116 This can enable the 
United States and the other permanent members “to make law merely 
for others, without being bound themselves.”117 
From the creation of the United Nations to the end of the Cold 
War, the Security Council was deadlocked between the two 
superpowers.118 This caused inaction, which combined with a 
tendency among states and international actors to view amnesty laws 
as matters of state sovereignty.119 As a result, for the first few decades 
of its existence, the UNSC did not routinely engage in amnesty 
debates within conflicted or transitional states. Following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Security Council became more active in 
responding to serious human rights violations. This was particularly 
evident in the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda,120 and the increased willingness to authorize 
peacekeeping troops to intervene in situations of mass violence.121 
These developments were mostly “actively furthered by U.S. 
governments interested in the added legitimacy that Council actions 
and authorizations confer.”122 Concurrently to these developments, 
 
115 Cassel, supra note 112, at 206–07. 
116 Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 398 (2005). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., JOHN PRADOS, KEEPERS OF THE KEYS: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL FROM TRUMAN TO BUSH (1991); THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM 
THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (David M. Malone ed., 2004). 
119 See Max Pensky, Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, and the Norms of 
International Law, 1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 1 (2008). 
120 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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Peacekeeping Operations, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 245 (1996). 
122 Krisch, supra note 116, at 398. 
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the UNSC also began to involve itself more directly in the amnesty 
decisions of nation states. 
The Amnesty Law Database has collated data on UNSC resolutions 
and statements on its involvement in eleven amnesty laws enacted 
between 1996 and 2009.123 As with the United States’ unilateral 
involvement, the UNSC’s involvement has been categorized into 
diplomatic, economic, legal, and military actions, and one amnesty 
process may have triggered multiple forms of involvement. For each 
of these actions to have been taken, the United States had to refrain 
from exercising its veto, from which it can be inferred that the U.S. 
either supported the action or acquiesced to it. Again, the data 
collected is not a comprehensive sample of UNSC decisions on 
amnesty, but the results are shown in Table 2: 
Table 2. United Nations Security Council involvement in amnesty laws 
 For Against 
Diplomatic 6 2 
Economic 0 0 
Legal 0 4 
Military 3 0 
Total 9 6 
This table illustrates that the UNSC has been more likely to 
endorse amnesty laws than to object to them. However, on four 
occasions the UNSC objected to amnesty on legal grounds. These 
objections relate to amnesties in Croatia in 1996, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999, and Darfur in Sudan in 2006. 
These instances indicate that the UNSC members were willing to state 
that amnesty laws for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity violated international law. However, as discussed below, 
the United States’ unilateral approach contradicted the position of the 
UNSC regarding the 1999 amnesty in Sierra Leone. This conflicting 
embrace by America of both accountability and amnesty will be 
 
123 This does not include U.N. Security Council resolutions that referred to amnesty 
laws in general, but rather specific laws that were proposed or enacted in a particular 
country. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) 
(“[E]mphasiz[ing] the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this 
regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty 
provisions.”). 
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explored in section IV in relation to domestic amnesties and support 
for foreign amnesties. 
III 
INSTRUMENTALIZING AMNESTY: AMERICA’S USE OF CLEMENCY 
PAST AND PRESENT 
The above sections have demonstrated that within the domestic 
legal system of the United States there are several mechanisms by 
which different organs of the state grant leniency to offenders. 
Furthermore, the United States has at times been willing to endorse 
foreign amnesty laws, even for crimes under international law. This 
acceptance of leniency conflicts with the leadership role America has 
played in the development of international justice. However, it does 
demonstrate a continuity of approach with the limitations placed on 
accountability for prisoner abuse. This section will examine this 
continuity by exploring the motivations for American enactment of or 
support for amnesties, which will be used to contextualize and explain 
the legal and political rationales used to justify limiting the pursuit of 
justice for torture. 
Part V will draw upon the pardons and amnesties included in two 
datasets relating to the United States’ engagement with amnesty laws. 
These historic examples will be analyzed in relation to four broad, 
overlapping themes that are drawn deductively from scholarly 
literature on presidential pardons and international law, together with 
the texts of the pardons and amnesties. These are amnesty, empire, 
and hegemony; amnesty, denial, and justificatory claimsmaking; law, 
politics, and pragmatism in the use of amnesties; and amnesty, mercy, 
and the public welfare. The themes are not to be viewed as precise 
categories, but rather as Weberian “ideal” types or heuristic models, 
and aspects of individual amnesty or pardon processes may relate to 
multiple themes. The relevance of each theme to the contemporary 
efforts to limit accountability will also be explored. 
A. Amnesty, Empire, and Hegemonic Power 
The concept of empire has its roots in the ancient Roman idea of 
imperium, which can be translated as the power to command. Within 
different aspects of Roman law, imperium referred to statutes, the 
legal authority of public officials, and to the territory over which the 
Roman Empire exercised power.124 Thus, Roman imperium entailed 
 
124 ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 493–4 (1953). 
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the direct exercise of power by a state over its subjects. With the 
onset of the Industrial Revolution, European nations hungry for both 
raw materials and markets developed a form of imperialism that was 
based on the overwhelming military, economic, and political power of 
the colonial state over the peoples it subjugated. This power was often 
justified by a belief in the racial, intellectual, and religious superiority 
of the colonizing nations.125 Empire during the colonial period shared 
with the Roman Empire an understanding of imperialism as supreme 
political power exercised by the metropolis over defined territories 
within its control. 
The granting of amnesties has long been closely associated with 
the exercise of power and sovereignty.126 For example, in 1922 Carl 
Schmitt developed his now famous definition of the sovereign as “he 
who decides on the exception” to the law.127 Similarly, Strange has 
argued that “officially sanctioned mercy, like severity, ultimately 
expresses the politics of rule.”128 Within these approaches, there is an 
assumption that by granting amnesty, the sovereign is expressing 
power that he or she already holds. However, of course, amnesties 
may be granted at moments when the sovereign has been weakened 
and wishes to reassert his or her power. As will be explored below, 
the use of amnesties to assert power and ensure compliance with laws 
imposed by the state were featured in the building of the American 
“empire” from independence until the end of the World War I. 
World War I marked the apex of direct territorial forms of empire, 
and in the following decades, historic empires were dismantled and 
most colonial peoples gradually gained their independence. Although 
territorial control has remained central to understandings of 
 
125 There are diverse theories of this era of imperialism. For example, Marxist traditions 
emphasize economic dominance. See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, IMPERIALISM THE 
HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1939); J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1967). 
Other scholars have placed more emphasis on cultural aspects of colonialism. See, e.g., 
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). For a compelling history of this period of 
Empire, see also E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 1875–1914 (1987). 
126 The relationship of mercy to power has been explored more fully in KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Kieran 
McEvoy & Louise Mallinder, Amnesties, Transitional Justice and Governing through 
Mercy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY (Jonathan Simon & 
Richard Sparks eds., 2012). 
127 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 1985). 
128 Carolyn Strange, Introduction to QUALITIES OF MERCY: JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT AND 
DISCRETION 3, 5 (Carolyn Strange ed., 1996). 
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imperialism,129 in the latter half of the twentieth century the concept 
evolved to recognize the diverse ways powerful states can exert 
dominance indirectly over the politics and economies of other 
countries. These indirect methods can entail powerful states forcing 
less powerful nations to bend to their will through granting or 
withholding military, financial, or political support. Alternatively, 
where the powerful states are hegemonic, they may exert “consensual 
dominance,” whereby weaker states adopt the ideological positions of 
the powerful.130 As will be explored below, following World War II, 
America attained the status of a hegemonic state, and has used this 
status to influence or directly impose amnesties in other parts of the 
world in order to enhance its own power. 
1. Amnesty and the Building of the American “Empire” 
The United States has long been reluctant to acknowledge its 
potential or actual role as an empire. As a nation that was forged in a 
struggle for independence against the tyrannies of the British Empire, 
the United States seeks to portray itself rather as “the friend of 
freedom everywhere.”131 Indeed, unlike the empires of Rome, the 
Ottomans, the Hapsburgs, Napoleon, or the British, America does not 
seek to establish expansive colonies across the world.132 Nonetheless, 
the issue of “empire” arose early in America’s history. For example, 
George Washington, whilst leader of the Continental Army following 
its victory in the American Revolutionary War, referred to the 
“foundation of our Empire” in his Circular to the States, on June 8, 
1783.133 At this stage, the term “empire” was used to denote 
Americans’ mission of settling the landmass of the continent, rather 
 
129 Mona Domosh, Selling Civilization: Toward a Cultural Analysis of America’s 
Economic Empire in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 29 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 453, 455 (2004). Indeed, in the 
post-World War II era, new territorial empires emerged, for example, the Soviet Union. 
130 See Christine Bell et al., The Battle for Transitional Justice: Hegemony, Iraq, and 
International Law, in JUDGES, TRANSITIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147, 153 (John 
Morison et al. eds., 2007) (discussing Gramsci’s theory of hegemony). 
131 Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire (Get Used to It), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003. 
132 It does, however, retain control over the following islands: Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and several other outlying 
islands. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-98-5, U.S. INSULAR 
AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997). Furthermore, it exercises 
administrative control over dependent territories, including Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. See 
Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval 
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133 GEORGE WASHINGTON, CIRCULAR TO THE STATES (1783), reprinted in THE 
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 218, 219 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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than overseas expansion. From this period until the Civil War, U.S. 
territory gradually expanded through a series of treaties with the 
British, Spanish, and French who had all exercised control over parts 
of the North American continent. By 1861, the United States already 
claimed control over most of the landmass of present-day America.134 
During this expansionist period, the federal government sought to 
employ amnesty laws to entrench its power against those who 
challenged it and to encourage insurgents to adhere to national laws. 
For example, in 1795 President George Washington proclaimed a 
“full, free and entire pardon . . . of all treasons, misprisions of treason, 
and other indictable offenses against the United States” for the 
participants in the Whiskey Rebellion.135 During this rebellion, 
farmers in the western counties of Pennsylvania rioted against the 
imposition of an excise tax on whiskey. This violence was viewed as 
a direct threat to the government’s authority, causing President 
Washington to respond by “[r]aising an army larger than the troops he 
commanded during most of the war with England and leading them 
himself into Pennsylvania”136 In the face of such concerted action, the 
rebellion soon collapsed and an agreement was reached on September 
2, 1794, which proclaimed that if the rebels adhered to the laws of the 
United States and paid the taxes on whiskey, they would be granted a 
pardon the following July. Washington duly complied with this 
promise and pardoned two leaders of the rebellion who had been 
convicted,137 along with the other participants. The pardon was, 
however, conditional on the recipients continuing to adhere to the 
laws, and it excluded every convicted person who failed to comply 
with the agreement.138 When a similar rebellion erupted in 1799, 
President Adams followed Washington’s example by enacting an 
amnesty for the insurgents.139 For both the 1795 and 1800 amnesty 
 
134 In addition, from 1822 to 1847 Liberia was a protectorate of the United States. 
135 Proclamation of Pardons in Western Pennsylvania (July 10, 1795) [hereinafter 
Washington Proclamation], reprinted in I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS 
VOL. I], at 181 (James C. Richardson ed., 1899) (proclamation by George Washington 
granting pardon to certain persons formally engaged in violence and obstruction of justice 
in protest of liquor laws in Pennsylvania). 
136 ALFONSO J. DAMICO, DEMOCRACY AND THE CASE FOR AMNESTY 27 (1975). 
137 P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, 
and Analysis (1900–1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 253–54 (1997). 
138 Washington Proclamation, supra note 135. 
139 Proclamation (May 21, 1800), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. I, 
supra note 135, at 303–04 [hereinafter Adams Proclamation] (proclamation by John  
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proclamations, government forces had suppressed the rebellions 
several months before the proclamations were issued, which meant 
that the amnesties were not used to encourage the insurgents to end 
their violent struggle, but rather to encourage them to continue to 
abide by the law once the government forces had returned to barracks. 
The outbreak of the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865 
triggered a series of amnesty laws for draft dodgers and rebels. The 
first amnesty for the insurgents was offered in 1863, while the war 
was raging, in order “to suppress the insurrection and to restore the 
authority of the United States.”140 It was conditional on the 
beneficiaries taking an oath to “henceforth faithfully support, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States . . . and . . . abide by 
and faithfully support all” congressional acts and presidential 
proclamations relating to slavery.141 Following the war’s conclusion, 
several subsequent amnesty laws were issued culminating in an 
unconditional amnesty for treason proclaimed by President Johnson in 
1868, when many in the South were resentful of the Reconstruction 
government and federal occupying forces, and paramilitary groups 
sought to resist the integration of freed slaves into the nation’s 
political life. Johnson’s 1868 amnesty proclamation sought to 
overcome these lingering resentments and “to secure a complete and 
universal establishment and prevalence of municipal law and order in 
conformity with the Constitution of the United States.”142 This 
 
Adams granting pardon to certain persons engaged in insurrection against the United 
States in the counties of Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks, in the state of 
Pennsylvania). This insurrection, known as the “Fries” or “House Tax” rebellion, arose in 
the counties of Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks in eastern Pennsylvania in 1799. It 
was aimed at preventing the execution of a law directed at the valuation of houses, land, 
and slaves for the purposes of taxation. German-American farmers who protested against 
the law had been arrested by a federal marshal, which prompted 100 men, led by Jacob 
Fries, to assail the marshal to demand the release of the farmers. The federal government 
again gathered a large number of troops, causing the insurgents to surrender without 
resistance. Fries and one other leader of the rebellion were convicted of treason and 
sentenced to be hanged. However, in May 1800, President Adams, acting against the 
advice of his cabinet pardoned the convicted men and the other insurgents. See Ruckman, 
supra note 137, at 254. 
140 Proclamation No. 111 (Mar. 26, 1864), reprinted in VI A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 218 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1907) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. VI] (proclamation by 
Abraham Lincoln concerning amnesty); see also Proclamation No. 108 (Dec. 8, 1863), 
reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS VOL. VI, supra, at 213–15 (proclamation by 
Abraham Lincoln regarding amnesty and reconstruction). 
141 Proclamation No. 108, supra note 140. 
142 Proclamation No. 170 (July 4, 1868), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS 
VOL. VI, supra note 140, at 655–56 (proclamation by Andrew Johnson granting pardon to  
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illustrates that during the first phase of American “empire” in which 
the United States sought to consolidate its control over the continent; 
amnesties were used as a means of reducing dissent against federal 
power and ensuring compliance with federal laws. 
Following the end of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, 
America’s “empire” began to spread beyond its landmass with the 
Spanish-American War. This war resulted in the Paris Peace Treaty of 
1898, in which Spain ceded to the United States control over Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.143 As the United States ruled 
over its new territories, it intermittently used amnesties to undermine 
dissent similar to how amnesties had been used within the United 
States. For example, in 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt 
proclaimed under his constitutional pardoning powers “a full and 
complete pardon and amnesty” to all persons in the Philippines who 
participated in insurrections against Spanish and American rule. To 
benefit, individuals were required to pledge to “recognize and accept 
the supreme authority of the United States of America in the 
Philippine Islands” and to “maintain true faith and allegiance” to the 
United States.144 As the American empire spread overseas, amnesty 
laws continued to be used to ensure adherence to federal laws and 
acceptance of the power of the government. 
2. Amnesty and the Exercise of Hegemonic Power 
From World War II, American power on the international stage 
shifted from direct exercises of power over peoples and territories, 
towards more hegemonic forms of dominance. This conception of 
empire resulted in the United States intervening financially, 
diplomatically, and militarily in the governance of states around the 
world. Following the end of the Cold War, America became the 
world’s sole superpower. This power means that even though 
America became “an empire without consciousness of itself as 
such,”145 or “[a]n [e]mpire in [d]enial,”146 it nonetheless was and is 
 
all persons participating in the late rebellion, except those under indictment for treason or 
other felony). 
143 Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. The treaty itself 
contained an amnesty in Article VI. Subsequently, the United States also had protectorate 
control over Nicaragua between 1912 and 1933. 
144 Proclamation No. 483 (July 4, 1902), reprinted in A SUPPLEMENT TO A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1902, at 392–94 
(George Raywood Devitt ed., 1903) (proclamation by Theodore Roosevelt granting pardon 
and amnesty to participants in insurrection in the Philippines). 
145 Ignatieff, supra note 131. 
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capable of (and frequently does) influencing the domestic policies of 
other states. 
Although America’s dominance enables it to influence the 
formation of global norms, it too is affected by evolution of those 
norms.147 In relation to amnesty laws, it is significant that the United 
States’ emergence as a global hegemonic power coincided with the 
growth of transitional justice and international criminal law, in which 
America became a leader. As noted above, these emerging legal 
frameworks arguably created restrictions of the use of amnesty laws, 
which the United States invoked in arguing against amnesties in 
contexts such as Bosnia, which will be explored below. In contrast, 
during and after the Cold War, the United States frequently endorsed 
foreign amnesties for its “allies” in the fight against communism148 or 
where it wished to broker peace settlements. In these instances, U.S. 
invocations of international law contradicted its statements elsewhere, 
as the amnesties were described by U.S. officials as protecting human 
rights, rather than violating them. Such pragmatism was also evident 
in domestic pardons for crimes relating to the Iran-Contra affair, 
which related to questions of presidential involvement in selling 
weapons to Iran while contravening congressional enactments by 
funneling the proceeds of weapons’ sales to the Contra death squads 
in Nicaragua.149 The domestic pardon for the American officials 
 
146 Niall Ferguson, An Empire in Denial: The Limits of US Imperialism, 25 HARV. 
INT’L L. REV. 64, 64 (2003). 
147 SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 204–05. 
148 For example, during the Cold War, the United States provided diplomatic and 
financial support for dictatorial regimes and in some cases, the United States was directly 
implicated in horrific episodes of human rights abuses, such as Operación Cóndor in Latin 
America, which received American financial and technical support (many of the personnel 
involved were trained to inflict terror at the American-run School of the Americas). See, 
e.g., J. PATRICE MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES: OPERATION CONDOR AND COVERT 
WAR IN LATIN AMERICA (2005); Katherine E. McCoy, Trained to Torture? The Human 
Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of the Americas, 32 LATIN AM. PERSP. 47 
(2005); Russell W. Ramsey & Antonio Raimondo, Human Rights Instruction at the U.S. 
Army School of the Americas, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 92 (2001). 
149 Criminal proceedings were brought against executive branch officials, and Oliver 
North was convicted for his role in the scandal. The political implications of this pardon 
were explored in several contemporary articles. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-
Contra Pardon Mess, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 883 (1992); Harold Hongju Koh, Begging Bush’s 
Pardon, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 889 (1992); Carl Levin & Henry Hyde, The Iran-Contra 
Pardons: Was it Wrong for Ex-President Bush to Pardon Six Defendants?, 79 A.B.A. J. 44 
(1993); Lawrence E. Walsh, Political Oversight, the Rule of Law, and Iran-Contra, 42 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587 (1994). 
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implicated in the affair sought to legitimize American support for the 
Contras.150 
In some cases, motivated by domestic and international policy 
priorities, American involvement in foreign amnesties moved beyond 
endorsement of the amnesty legislation to actively pressuring local 
actors to grant amnesties. For example, in 1994, when America was 
faced with a stream of Haitian refugees fleeing the military junta, the 
U.S. government responded by pressuring deposed, democratically-
elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide to agree to a peace deal 
granting a broad amnesty and permitting the junta leaders to go into 
exile. In this instance there was strong resistance to the amnesty 
policy from the Haitian officials, with the result that U.S. involvement 
extended to drafting the text of the amnesty legislation.151 The U.N. 
and the Organization of American States endorsed America’s amnesty 
proposal, but their acquiescence was described as “the usual post cold 
war charade . . . in which the US uses a tame UN to give international 
legitimacy to the pursuit of its own very particular foreign policy 
objectives.”152 This example highlights the difficulties faced by 
smaller states in resisting American pressure to introduce amnesty 
laws. 
At first glance, American engagement with amnesties as an 
exercise of its hegemonic power contrasts with the domestic 
amnesties enacted during its empire-building phase. The latter were 
introduced to encourage law-abiding behavior, whereas the former 
amnesties were often used to reward the law-breaking behavior of 
ideological allies. However, there are commonalities in that for both 
phases of U.S. empire, involvement in amnesty debates was designed 
to influence the outcome of political conflict in order to suit the 
priorities of the United States, and to weaken the opponents of 
American power. 
The language of “empire” underwent a resurgence during the Bush 
presidency. For example, Charles Krauthammer proclaimed a few 
months before September 11, 2001, that “America is no mere 
international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more 
dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position 
 
150 See Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (Dec. 24, 1992) (proclamation by 
George H.W. Bush granting executive clemency). 
151 Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute 
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (1996). 
152 Dominic Lawson, The Pressure of Gunboat Diplomacy: Britain Has Offered the 
U.S. Two Warships to Help Invade Haiti, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994. 
344 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities. How? 
By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will.”153 More 
directly, as a Bush administration official told investigative reporter 
Ronald Suskind, “We are an empire. We make our own reality.”154 
Unlike the preceding decades, during the Bush presidency, America’s 
“empire” once again engaged in territorial domination in the military 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Following the 
“regime changes” in these countries, the United States used amnesties 
to weaken insurgencies that challenged its interests. For example, on 
January 7, 2004, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority,155 Paul Bremer, declared an amnesty for over 500 Iraqis156 
who were being held by coalition forces for suspected involvement in 
insurgency. The amnesty offer excluded anyone who was accused of 
having “blood on their hands” by, for example, causing death or 
serious physical injury to an Iraqi citizen or member of the coalition 
forces.157 Mr. Bremer, when announcing the amnesty, said that it was 
expected to contribute to American efforts to win the “hearts and 
minds” of the Iraqi people, following complaints about heavy-handed 
tactics.158 In short, the amnesty was designed to support broader U.S. 
strategies of governance and control over Iraq. 
3. Torture, Hegemony, and Creating Exceptions to the Law 
As this section has explored, since independence the United States 
has grown from establishing control over its current territorial 
boundaries, through gaining increasing power on the international 
 
153 Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001. 
154 See Raymond Michalowski, Power, Crime and Criminology in the New Imperial 
Age, 51 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 310 (2009). 
155 Following the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its 
allies, the occupying powers established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as a 
transitional government, which was empowered to exercise executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over Iraq. The allies cited U.N. Security Council “Resolution 1483 
(2003) and the laws and usages of war” as the legal basis to establish the CPA. Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Reg. No. 1 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition 
.org/regulations/. 
156 This number represented only four percent of the Iraqis believed to be in U.S. 
custody at that time. See Luke Harding & Richard Norton Taylor, U.S. Frees Iraqis After 
British Protest, GUARDIAN (London) Jan. 8, 2004. 
157 James Rupert, U.S. Hopes Key Policy Reversal Will Help to Quell Iraq Insurgency, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004. 
158 Stephen Farrell, Prisoners Freed in Bid for Hearts and Minds, TIMES (London), Jan. 
8, 2004, at 20; US to Release 506 Iraqi Prisoners, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004; U.S. Begins 
Releasing Iraqi Prisoners: At Least One Vows Revenge, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Jan. 8, 
2004. 
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stage, to becoming the world’s sole superpower. This dominance 
enables the United States to use international law as an instrument of 
power, to regulate the behavior of other states and entrench its 
policies and worldview.159 However, the regulations of international 
law also apply to the United States, and can constrain its exercises of 
dominance. Where this occurs, powerful states, like the United States, 
have a range of “soft and hard options,” including violating the law, 
creating an exceptional legal regime that applies to the hegemonic 
state, and changing the applicable rules to suit the hegemon’s 
interests.160 
As was explored above, torture is explicitly prohibited in multiple 
international treaties and U.S. domestic law. This constrained the 
legality of the Bush administration’s policy of coercive interrogation. 
As a result, the administration’s political and strategic goals came into 
conflict with the state’s obligations under international law. Through 
the framing of the struggle against terrorism as a “war,” and 
reinterpreting America’s legal obligations in the torture memos, the 
Bush administration attempted to assert its hegemonic power by 
reshaping applicable international law to create an exception for the 
United States. 
At the domestic level, the decisions not to prosecute prisoner abuse 
by CIA interrogators differ from the amnesties enacted during the 
United States’ empire-building phase, as, although both benefited 
persons who were acting outside the United States’ federal laws, the 
rebels in the earlier amnesties were challenging the authority of the 
federal government, whereas the CIA interrogators committed torture 
as part of a federally sanctioned policy. Consequently, the rationale 
for granting the interrogators amnesty is not to dissuade them from 
future law breaking, but to protect official institutions and personnel 
and to limit challenges to their legitimacy. In this way, the decisions 
not to prosecute can be compared to the United States’ support for 
Cold War amnesties, which were designed to protect U.S. allies from 
accountability. Such forms of amnesty are designed to create 
exceptions to the law, by exempting those who usually deserve 
punishment from criminal sanction. By creating such exceptions from 
its international and domestic legal obligations, the United States has 
 
159 Krisch, supra note 116, at 371. 
160 Bell et al., supra note 130, at 153–4 (citing Michael Byers, Presumptive Self-
Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171, 171–
74 (2003)). 
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demonstrated not just its ability to assert its power to commit serious 
human rights violations, but also to evade international standards on 
accountability that it seeks to encourage nations in other parts of the 
world to uphold. As the following section will explore, this double 
standard challenges the United States’ self-image as an exemplary 
state. 
B. Amnesty, Denial, and Justificatory Claimsmaking 
America has been described as an “exceptional” society since 
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America in 1831.161 This 
study, and much of the subsequent literature, has found that in 
comparison to other developed nations, “the United States was 
created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be 
understood differently–essentially on its own terms and within its 
own context.”162 This perception has given rise to a rich literature 
exploring the uniqueness of different aspects of America’s political, 
cultural, religious, and economic life that is too vast to be explored in 
this article. Instead, this section will restrict itself to exploring, 
through the lens of amnesties, how America’s perception of itself as 
an exceptional society has influenced its justifications for 
involvement in human rights violations and the legal responses to 
these crimes. 
From the earliest Puritan settlements in the “New World,” a self-
understanding of America’s national values and global role has 
resonated through the nation’s political discourse. This view was 
presciently encapsulated in 1630 in a sermon by Puritan leader (and 
later New England Governor), John Winthrop, who described the 
society that the Puritans sought to create as a “city upon a hill,”163 
which would provide a shining example for the world through its 
commitments to liberty, democracy, equality, and religious devotion. 
Furthermore, he suggested that the success of this society that they 
were trying to establish would be ensured by the promotion of these 
goals at home and abroad. This concept, which Goodhart has termed 
“[p]rovidential exceptionalism,” refers to “a commonplace American 
belief that theirs is a chosen nation, one upon which Providence has 
bestowed special blessings and which has been charged with a special 
 
161 E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). 
162 Byron E. Shafer, Preface to IS AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM, at v (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991). 
163 John Winthrop, Sermon, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630). 
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world-historical mission to cultivate and promote its values.”164 Such 
conceptions of exceptionalism have been invoked in the rhetoric of 
nearly every American president, and Presidents Kennedy and 
Reagan explicitly cited Winthrop in speeches.165 It was particularly 
evident in the “Bush Doctrine,”166 and has continued into the Obama 
presidency.167 This self-perception of America as a nation of values 
has affected why and how clemency has been used by different 
administrations. 
As noted above, amnesty laws seek to prevent specified crimes or 
offenders being investigated, but when they are issued, they generally 
entail an assumption that crimes have been committed, and indeed, in 
some cases, the beneficiaries have been convicted prior to the 
amnesty’s proclamation.168 Where amnestied acts are labeled as 
crimes, this has the potential to convey social disapproval of the acts 
in a similar manner to the expressivist functions of prosecution.169 
However, in some contexts, states may seek to use the enactment of 
amnesty legislation to reinterpret or justify these crimes, in order to 
alter how they are perceived by society.170 Such forms of denial are 
prevalent where the state has responsibility for violence.171 Amnesties 
 
164 Michael Goodhart, Reverting to Form: American Exceptionalism and International 
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165 Koh, supra note 4, at 1481 n.4. 
166 For example, in his second inaugural speech, President George W. Bush 
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liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best 
hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” President 
George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www 
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167 For example, in his inaugural speech, President Obama invoked America’s 
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President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, supra note 2. 
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criminal sanctions. However, some restorative forms of amnesty that are offered in 
exchange for offenders admitting their acts publicly may have a similar expressive role. 
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can contribute to such by “wiping the slate clean” regarding the 
offenders’ criminality, limiting the scope of investigations into 
particular allegations, or using amnesty legislation to privilege the 
official account of disputed historical narratives. In this way, an 
amnesty law may not be simply a tool for forgetting the crimes, but 
rather a legal means to reinterpret and re-present them as unworthy 
of punishment. Where amnesties are used to promote such 
reinterpretations, they are part of official claimsmaking discourse,172 
whereby states hope that by using a legal measure such as amnesty to 
assert a clear position on the deserving nature of the crimes, this 
portrayal will become accepted and established within the nation’s 
collective memory.173 Drawing on Stan Cohen’s seminal account of 
denial, this section will explore how America’s engagement with 
amnesty laws has been used to reinforce its national self-image 
through reinterpretation and justification of amnestied crimes. 
1. Amnesty and Interpretative Denial 
Interpretative denial entails arguing “what happened is really 
something else.”174 It can take many forms, ranging from developing 
euphemisms to conceal or minimize the true nature of particular 
crimes (for example, labeling torture with the more neutral sounding 
term “enhanced interrogation”) to developing legal strategies to 
undermine internationally accepted legal definitions and principles 
(the torture memos provide a clear example of this approach). Among 
the amnesties enacted or endorsed by the United States, 
reinterpretations have included describing crimes as the misguided 
actions of normally patriotic and law-abiding citizens. 
Several of America’s domestic amnesty laws and pardons have 
reinterpreted offenders’ actions in order to portray them as deserving 
of mercy due to their heroic or misguided behavior. For example, 
President Adams’ 1800 amnesty proclamation characterized 
participants in a rebellion against taxation as “the ignorant, 
misguided, and misinformed,” who had “returned to a proper sense of 
their duty.”175 Subsequently, in 1815, President Madison pardoned a 
 
172 For a discussion of claimsmaking, see MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, 
CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2000); Joel Best, Rhetoric in Claims-Making: 
Constructing the Missing Children Problem, 34 SOC. PROBS. 101 (1987). 
173 For a discussion of how law can shape collective memory, see OSIEL, supra note 
169; Susanne Karstedt, Introduction to LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
MEMORIES 1, 1–23 (Susanne Karstedt ed., 2009) 
174 COHEN, supra note 171, at 103. 
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group of 800 smugglers in Louisiana, known as “the Barataria 
pirates,” who had traded illegally with foreign states in violation of 
American acts on revenue, trade, and navigation. As part of the War 
of 1812 between the United States and British Empire, Britain tried to 
capture New Orleans, and they offered the leader of the Barataria 
pirates, Jean Laffite, “$30,000, a pardon, and a captaincy in exchange 
for assistance in the attack.”176 He refused and his pirates fought with 
the U.S. government to defend the city.177 In recognition of their 
actions, President Madison proclaimed a pardon for them on February 
6, 1815, stating: 
[T]hey have abandoned the prosecution of the worse cause for the 
support of the best, and . . . they have exhibited in the defense of 
New Orleans unequivocal traits of courage and fidelity. Offenders 
who have refused to become the associates of the enemy in the war 
upon the most seducing terms of invitation and who have aided to 
repel his hostile invasion of the territory of the United States can no 
longer be considered as objects of punishment, but as objects of a 
generous forgiveness.178 
In this way, the amnesty proclamation transformed the pirates from 
criminals, who violated the laws of the United States, to patriotic 
heroes, who fought to protect America from external enemies. 
A similar approach was taken in an 1863 amnesty for Civil War 
draft evasion and desertion, in which those who surrendered and 
partook of the amnesty were described as “patriotic and faithful 
citizens” in contrast to the “evil-disposed and disloyal persons” who 
engaged in desertion.179 Similarly, President Johnson’s 1867 amnesty 
proclamation described the population of the former Confederation as 
having become “well and loyally disposed” and as conforming, “or, if 
permitted to do so, will conform” to state or federal law.180 Patriotic 
language was also invoked in later pardons. For example, the 
preamble to President Bush Sr.’s pardon for the Iran-Contra Affair 
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178 Proclamation No. 19 (Feb. 6, 1815), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS 
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extolled at length the “true American” patriotism and service of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had been indicted for 
perjury and obstruction of justice.181 While it is true that Secretary 
Weinberger had worked in public service for almost three decades, by 
emphasizing this aspect of his background, rather than repudiating his 
role in selling missiles to Iran to fund death squads in Nicaragua, the 
pardon was used to frame his actions as having been motivated by 
patriotism, and therefore, justifiable. 
2. Amnesty and Justificatory Denial 
Cohen identified a second form of denial (which he terms 
“implicatory” denial) as denial that partially acknowledges criticism 
of the state’s actions, but argues “what happened is justified.”182 In 
this approach, crimes come to be seen as acts that, although excessive 
or disproportionate, were carried out for a greater public good, such 
as defeating communism or global terrorism. America’s belief in its 
own inherent righteousness has at times resulted in it developing 
justificatory forms of denial to explain its involvement in violence or 
support for repressive foreign allies. For example, politicians often 
frame America’s participation in international conflicts as a fight 
against evil, in which all those who act with America, despite their 
methods, are portrayed as heroes, whereas their opponents are 
described as “evil.”183 
 
181 “Some of the best and most dedicated of our countrymen were called upon to step 
forward. Secretary Weinberger was among the foremost.” Proclamation No. 6518, supra 
note 150. 
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Justificatory forms of denial are present in the language of 
numerous American amnesties and political pardons. For example, 
President Adams’ 1800 amnesty described the 1799 uprising as the 
“wicked and treasonable insurrection against the just authority of the 
United States of America,” which the state had suppressed “speedily  
. . . without any of the calamities usually attending rebellion.”184 Later 
in the wake of the Civil War, the preamble to President Johnson’s 
1867 amnesty proclamation for those who participated in the 
“rebellion” opened by affirming the official narrative of the conflict: 
[T]he war then existing was not waged on the part of the 
Government in any spirit of oppression nor for any purpose of 
conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering 
with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend 
and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the 
Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States 
unimpaired.185 
In this context, the terms of the amnesty were used to articulate the 
righteousness of the state’s cause. 
As Cohen notes, justificatory claimsmaking can also include 
contextualizing events by asserting that “normal standards of 
judgment cannot apply because the country’s circumstances—
terrorism, isolation, nuclear threats—are unique.”186 Such 
contextualization was evident in America’s struggle against the threat 
of communism during the Cold War, which, as noted above, caused 
the United States to endorse or even demand broad amnesties for its 
allies that covered their most atrocious crimes. For example, in 1988, 
commenting on the agreement of a ceasefire in the Nicaraguan civil 
war, in which all political prisoners would be released and the Contras 
would be permitted to participate in national reconciliation, U.S. 
Secretary of State, George P. Schultz, described the actions of the 
Contras in Nicaragua as the “determination and sacrifice of the 
freedom fighters.”187 In a similar way to domestic U.S. amnesties and 
pardons, the text of these foreign amnesties often sought to portray a 
particular narrative of a conflict. For example, following the “dirty 
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wars” in South America,188 military crimes that were amnestied were 
often framed as having been committed in response to the threat from 
left-wing terrorism, an approach known within South America as the 
“theory of the two demons.”189 These narratives chimed with 
America’s own rationales for its involvement in human rights 
violations in the hemisphere and elsewhere, and by supporting these 
amnesties, it may have sought to bolster its own justifications. 
More recently, in his 1992 pardon for Caspar Weinberger and 
others for their conduct related to the Iran-Contra affair, President 
Bush Sr. used the amnesty legislation to highlight what the State 
perceived to be America’s achievements in the previous six years. In 
the preamble to the pardon, he stated that, during that period, “the last 
American hostage has come home to freedom, worldwide terrorism 
has declined, the people of Nicaragua have elected a democratic 
government, and the Cold War has ended in victory for the American 
people and the cause of freedom we championed.”190 Each of these 
events had taken place, but they were not directly related to the 
amnestied acts, or the individuals benefiting from the pardon. It 
therefore seems that President Bush Sr. included this celebration of 
official triumphs in the pardon to justify and minimize the granting of 
clemency to perpetrators of serious offenses. 
3. Denial, Claimsmaking, and Prisoner Abuse 
The officially sanctioned policies of torture, rendition, and 
arbitrary detention during the Bush administration are clearly at odds 
with America’s self-image as a society uniquely founded on 
commitments to liberty, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. It 
can be argued that these values were debased by the policies of 
torture.191 However, rather than focusing on accountability to reassert 
these values, the politics of denial and claimsmaking have featured in 
the legal responses to the abuses. For example, when announcing that 
no prosecutions would be pursued for those who had acted within the 
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parameters of the legal advice given in the torture memos, President 
Obama took care to note that: 
[t]he men and women of our intelligence community serve 
courageously on the front lines of a dangerous world. Their 
accomplishments are unsung and their names unknown, but because 
of their sacrifices, every single American is safer. We must protect 
their identities as vigilantly as they protect our security, and we 
must provide them with the confidence that they can do their 
jobs.192 
In this statement, President Obama sought to contextualize prisoner 
abuse within the unique security threats faced by the United States in 
the post-9/11 world. By emphasizing the work of the intelligence 
community in “keeping America safe,” the decision not to prosecute 
reinforced the arguments made by some commentators that coercive 
interrogation methods extracted some useful information from 
detainees.193 This demonstrates an official reluctance to consider 
empirical evidence on international experiences, which demonstrate 
that torture rarely produces useful information,194 and may have been 
counterproductive for American national security. 
In contrast to the official discourse of the federal government, 
legislators195 and human rights organizations within the United 
States196 have argued that investigations and prosecutions are 
necessary. These campaigns contend that greater accountability would 
“convey to citizens a disapproval of violations and support for core 
democratic values”;197 communicate to the world America’s 
commitment to its international legal obligations;198 and enhance 
legitimacy, accountability, and transparency within domestic 
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institutions. These arguments have both legal and political weight, but 
it seems that, to date, they have been trumped in official 
policymaking by more pragmatic concerns. 
C. Law, Politics, and Pragmatism in the Use of Amnesty 
Doctrinal approaches to the production of legal knowledge 
emphasize the value of consistency, continuity, universality, 
objectivity, and fairness offered by law.199 Here, law is portrayed as 
“separate from—and ‘above,’”—decisions motivated by politics, 
economics, culture, or religion.200 Where issues are characterized as 
“legal questions” rather than matters of political or social policy, they 
are deemed to be “settled and not debatable.”201 However, this 
conceals the extent to which law is constituted by politics and can be 
instrumentalized within political decision-making. Indeed, as studies 
of law and politics reveal, “[l]aw is one of the central products of 
politics and the prize over which many political struggles are 
waged.”202 Under such pragmatic or instrumentalist views, laws are 
not honored or valued for their intrinsic nature or status, but rather 
because of the outcomes that law can help policymakers achieve.203 
This complex interplay between law and politics is often starkly 
revealed in public or legislative debates on the need for, and the scope 
of, amnesty legislation. Indeed, as noted by French jurist, Joseph 
Barthélemy, enacting an amnesty “is an act of high politics.”204 As 
this section will explore, pragmatic approaches to resolving domestic 
political disputes, responding to domestic public opinion, and 
delivering foreign policy priorities have all influenced America’s 
engagement with amnesty laws. 
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1. Amnesty and the Role of Law in National Politics 
Among the amnesties proclaimed by American presidents for 
political offenses committed within the United States, amnesty was 
often described as necessary to unite the country and focus on the 
future. For example, President Johnson, in his 1867 amnesty 
proclamation contrasted the positive outcomes of amnesties with the 
risks of prosecutions: “[A] retaliatory or vindictive policy, attended 
by unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscation, and 
disenfranchisements, now, as always, could only tend to hinder 
reconciliation among the people and national restoration, while it 
must seriously embarrass, obstruct, and repress popular energies and 
national industry and enterprise . . . .”205 Here, rebuilding the country 
after the Civil War was viewed as a political task, in which law could 
be subordinated to the achievement of political goals. 
Although, since the Civil War, the United States has not faced such 
serious threats to its national unity, subsequent U.S. amnesties have 
continued to be justified as necessary to end divisive, domestic 
political contestation. However, such contestation though damaging, 
poses little threat of armed conflict erupting on American soil. For 
example, thirty days after President Nixon was forced to resign due to 
the Watergate scandal, his chosen successor, President Ford, 
pardoned his predecessor.206 Unsurprisingly, this pardon was 
criticized as being politically motivated, prompting President Ford to 
appear before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice to justify his decision.207 He 
argued that the pardon was necessary to “change our national focus    
. . . [t]o shift attention from the pursuit of a fallen president to the 
pursuit of urgent needs of a rising nation.”208 He continued that, 
without pardon, “[d]uring this long period of delay and potential 
litigation, ugly passions would again be aroused. And our people 
would again be polarized in their opinions. And the credibility of our 
free institutions of government would again be challenged at home 
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and abroad.”209 In this statement, President Ford identified multiple 
threats posed by prosecutions including polarizing public opinion, 
undermining the legitimacy of the state, and weakening national 
recovery. Here, as with the post-Civil War era, these priorities are 
primarily political challenges, and hence the pardon was used to 
create exceptions to the rule of law that would arguably serve political 
goals. 
President George Bush Sr. raised similar arguments in his pardon 
for the Iran-Contra Affair, in which, after citing a number of historical 
American amnesties, he declared: “[M]y predecessors acted because it 
was time for the country to move on. Today I do the same.”210 He 
further highlighted the complex relationship between crime and 
politics by arguing: 
The prosecutions of the individuals I am pardoning represent what I 
believe is a profoundly troubling development in the political and 
legal climate of our country: the criminalization of policy 
differences. These differences should be addressed in the political 
arena, without the Damocles sword of criminality hanging over the 
heads of some of the combatants. The proper target is the President, 
not his subordinates; the proper forum is the voting booth, not the 
courtroom.211 
This quote is surprising, given that the beneficiaries were being 
investigated for involvement in criminal acts at the time the pardon 
was proclaimed. By introducing the pardon, President Bush was 
clearly trying to transform a legal matter—namely, whether 
individual acts of criminality should be prosecuted—into a political 
matter focusing on the government policies under which the crimes 
were committed. 
2. Amnesty to Satisfy Public Opinion 
Political pragmatism can cause pardons to be enacted to satisfy 
public demands for leniency. Among domestic amnesties in the 
United States, pro-amnesty public opinion is most evident for 
amnesties for draft evasion and desertion. For example, soon after the 
end of World War II, a campaign emerged to demand amnesty for 
persons who had been imprisoned or were liable for punishment for 
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violating the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.212 A 1946 
Gallup poll showed that an amnesty for conscientious objectors was 
supported by 69 percent of the American public.213 The high degree of 
public support forced a reluctant White House to respond, and on 
December 23, 1947, President Truman granted pardon for a limited 
number of imprisoned deserters.214 
Pro-amnesties public opinion became a controversial issue again as 
mass protests against the Vietnam War erupted in the late 1960s, 
prompting thousands of conscripts to evade the draft or desert, often 
by leaving the United States.215 The protests prompted the judiciary 
and armed forces to take a more lenient approach to the penalties 
imposed, but this did not resolve the issue.216 By September 16, 1974, 
one year after the last U.S. serviceman had left Vietnam, President 
Ford granted amnesty to encourage the deserters to return. However, 
the amnesty was conditioned on the applicants performing up to two 
years of “alternative service in the national interest.”217 Many “viewed 
the demand for alternative service as a form of punishment” and only 
a fraction of deserters or draft evaders applied for amnesty.218 Their 
ongoing resistance prompted a subsequent amnesty in 1977, in which 
these conditions were removed, allowing most affected persons to 
return home.219 This example suggests that, where sufficient sections 
of the public resist government policies, it can correspond to public 
support for amnesties for those who violate the law by their 
resistance. Where the state responds to public pressure by enacting 
amnesties, it may be a pragmatic decision to enhance the state’s 
legitimacy where the opposition to its policies had weakened it. 
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3. Amnesty and Foreign Policy Priorities 
In addition to pragmatic decisions resulting from national policies 
or domestic public opinion, the United States has chosen to enact or 
endorse amnesties as a response to international events. For example, 
following World War II, America led the establishment of the 
international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. With the onset of the 
Cold War, America’s enthusiasm for these tribunals waned as Japan 
and Germany came to be perceived as potentially useful allies in the 
struggle against communism. These strategic concerns caused the 
American head of the occupying forces in Japan, General MacArthur, 
to shield Emperor Hirohito from prosecution and to press for the 
introduction of an amnesty. The law was enacted on March 28, 1948, 
and resulted in unconditional amnesty being granted to all Japanese 
soldiers, including those accused of serious crimes.220 Consequently, 
despite an early commitment to prosecute Japanese war crimes, 
political concerns took precedence over law. 
This pattern continued during the Cold War. For example, nearly 
all the countries that participated in the United States-backed 
Operación Cóndor program of repression of political dissent in South 
America also enacted amnesty laws to shield the agents of state terror 
from prosecution. Many of these amnesties received America’s tacit 
backing or even vocal support. For example, following General 
Pinochet’s 1978 amnesty decree, which granted unconditional 
impunity to perpetrators of serious human rights violations, the U.S. 
State Department proclaimed that the decree was “a positive 
contribution by the government of Chile to the improvement of the 
human rights situation in that country.”221 Here, U.S. officials invoked 
the language of human rights law, but used it to endorse an amnesty 
that benefited only those who had violated human rights. In doing so, 
America sought to shield its supporters from criminal proceedings 
that would potentially reveal America’s complicity in the violence. 
More positively, Cold War ideology also caused the United States 
to pressure Soviet bloc countries to issue amnesties for dissidents 
whose political views were perceived as more in tune with American 
policy than with their own governments’. For example, on November 
25, 1977, President Carter said it was a “wise and generous act” of 
 
220 Amnesty Law, Law No. 20 of 1947 (Japan), reprinted in 6059 KANPO 
FUKKOKUBAN 185 (Official Gazette, Reprint ed., Mar. 28, 1947). Freeman notes that “[i]n 
1946, General MacArthur released nearly one million political prisoners in Japan.” 
Freeman, supra note 51, at 519. 
221 Amnesty Decreed, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., May 12, 1978. 
2012] Power, Pragmatism and Prisoner Abuse: 359 
Amnesty and Accountability in the United States 
Yugoslavia to grant amnesty to political prisoners.222 Similarly, in 
1984, the United States made the release of dissidents a condition for 
any warming of relations with Poland, and on July 23, 1984, the 
American State Department welcomed a prisoner amnesty as a 
“positive step.”223 The position America took in relation to the harms 
inflicted on political prisoners in Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 
1980s stands in stark contrast to its policies on amnesties for those 
who perpetrated disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture 
on dissidents in South America during the same period. 
Such Janus-faced approaches to amnesty continued to be featured 
in American foreign policy during the 1990s. For example, at the 
same time as the United States was pressuring the Haitian government 
to grant amnesty for the crimes of the military junta, it provided 
considerable financial, human, and political aid to the creation and 
functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Hazan argues that this support sprung from a 
desire to play “the Tribunal as a moral card against the virulent 
criticism” from the media and the public of American reluctance to 
intervene militarily to stop ethnic cleansing.224 However, with regards 
to the Balkans, American support for the ICTY led the U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, to proclaim that the 
United States would “oppose vigorously any . . . amnesty” for war 
crimes.225 Ultimately, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, personally negotiated the provisions relating to 
accountability for war crimes in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord that 
ended the conflict in Bosnia. The accord required the parties to the 
agreement to cooperate with the ICTY and to enact amnesty laws that 
excluded crimes that fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.226 Whilst 
these measures represent laudable achievements for justice, 
America’s pronouncements on the legality of amnesties for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity were not applied to its 
involvement in other conflicts. 
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One year after the Dayton Peace Accords, America helped to 
negotiate the Abidjan Peace Accord for Sierra Leone that offered an 
unconditional amnesty for the serious human rights violations that 
had occurred there.227 It repeated its support for broad amnesties in 
Sierra Leone in 1999 when it helped to broker the Lomé Accords.228 
The 1999 accords prompted Madeleine Albright, who was by now 
Secretary of State, to deviate from her position on the Balkans, by 
describing the amnesty as “the price of peace [that had been] so 
desperately needed.”229 By 1999, the United States had spent $250 
million on humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, and it appears to have 
run out of patience. As a result, it deviated from the position of the 
U.N. Security Council to push for a peace agreement including 
amnesty to end the conflict.230 The contrast between American 
approaches to amnesty in the Balkans, and the amnesties in Sierra 
Leone and Haiti, reveal that during the Clinton administration, the 
United States declined to adopt legalistic and uniform positions on 
amnesty laws for serious human rights violations. Instead, the U.S. 
took a more malleable approach that was adopted to suit its political 
priorities. Arguably, the privileging of political concerns over legal 
obligations continues to be evident in the response to prisoner abuse. 
4. Prisoner Abuse, National Unity, and the Risks of Politicalization 
Part C has demonstrated how America deployed or encouraged the 
deployment of amnesty laws to achieve a range of political goals. In 
some instances, the United States used international law to legitimize 
its preferred policy approaches by, for example, invoking the 
language of human rights to endorse amnesties for human rights 
abuses as a means to end abuses. Where international law’s 
requirements came into conflict with U.S. policy goals, America’s 
international legal obligations were marginalized. This privileging of 
pragmatic political concerns has also been evident in the debates on 
prosecutions for prisoner abuse. For example, in his 2009 statement 
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on the release of the torture memos, President Obama emphasized the 
need for national unity, rather than accountability: 
This is a time for reflection, not retribution. We have been through a 
dark and painful chapter in our history. But at a time of great 
challenges and disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by 
spending our time and energy laying blame for the past. That is why 
we must resist the forces that divide us, and instead come together 
on behalf of our common future.231 
Speaking to the press a few days later, President Obama, endorsing 
the DOJ decision that prosecutions would not be pursued for those 
who had acted within the guidance outlined in the memos, stated: “As 
a general view, I do think we should be looking forward, not back. I 
do worry about this getting so politicised that we cannot function 
effectively and it hampers our ability to carry out national security 
operations.”232 This position reveals two arguments related to 
pragmatism: firstly, that prosecutions “would criminalize policy 
differences,” and would create a negative precedent of a U.S. 
administration launching prosecutions based on the policies of its 
predecessor.233 And secondly, that prisoner abuse was committed to 
protect national security, and that, given the serious challenges faced 
by the nation, national unity should be privileged over retribution. 
The former argument has primarily been articulated by the political 
right in the United States, which, according to Forsythe, would view 
prosecutions as being “motivated by partisan politics.”234 In contrast, 
the American political left would see limited prosecutions as 
insufficient, as they would “scapegoat[e] the little fish while letting 
policy makers and lawyers off the hook.”235 Therefore, at opposite 
ends of the spectrum there is an assumption that decisions on the 
extent to which prosecutions should be conducted would be 
influenced by political concerns. As torture is criminalized within 
domestic and international law—and, in ordinary circumstances, its 
punishment should be perceived as an exclusively legal matter—the 
emphasis placed on politics in these debates is striking. Outside 
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political circles in Washington, D.C., it seems that there was some 
public support for investigations. For example, a Gallup poll 
conducted in early February 2009 indicated that thirty-eight percent 
of respondents said that they supported criminal investigations of 
torture claims by the Justice Department, and a further twenty-four 
percent said they would prefer a non-criminal investigation by an 
independent panel. In addition, there was international pressure for 
prosecutions. For example, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture 
repeatedly called upon America to investigate accusations of 
torture.236 Furthermore, investigations of torture and rendition were 
launched in the courts of foreign states under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction.237 Nonetheless, the Obama administration 
seems to have attempted to sidestep both domestic and international 
calls for accountability, preferring instead to avoid the anticipated 
“political storm” that risks undermining the government’s ability to 
fulfill its other policy priorities, such as economic recovery and health 
care reform (on which the President needed the cooperation of 
Congressional Republicans to deliver).238 
The second argument for pragmatism relates to the need for 
national unity in the face of security threats. For example, following 
the Attorney General’s announcement in June 2011 that investigations 
into CIA interrogators would only proceed in two cases, the CIA 
Director, Leon Panetta, said “I have always believed that [the CIA’s] 
 
236 Peter Baker & Scott Shane, Pressure Grows to Investigate Interrogations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009; see also Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights Chief Urges Obama to 
Prosecute Torturers, REUTERS, May 14, 2009; Stephanie Nebehay, WikiLeaks Files 
Should Prompt Iraq Abuse Probe: U.N., REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2010; U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Council, Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of 
Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (Feb. 19, 2010); U.N. High 
Commissioner for Hum. Rts., U.S. Membership in the Human Rights Council (May 14, 
2009), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/BECC7BAC2F03 
BACBC12575C100394C58?opendocument. 
237 For example, on April 29, 2009, following a request by human rights lawyers, 
Spanish investigating magistrate Baltasar Garzón launched a criminal investigation into 
allegations of torture at Guantánamo made against six Bush administration officials who 
created the policies that permitted torture to occur. See Spanish Judge Opens Guantanamo 
Investigation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 2009; Jason Webb, Spanish Judge Keeps 
Guantanamo Probe Alive, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2009; Spanish Judge Asks U.S. if It Will 
Probe Torture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2009. The possibility of universal jurisdiction 
proceedings against Bush administration officials had concerned Donald Rumsfeld as 
early as 2003. See Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense on the Judicialization of 
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primary responsibility is not to the past, but to the present and future 
threats to the nation.”239 This view chimes with the approach of the 
right wing in American politics that prosecutions would be “unwise in 
the light of national security needs.”240 A more centrist position was 
adopted by Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), Chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, who justified his calls for a truth 
commission to investigate prisoner abuse by portraying a truth 
commission as “a middle ground” between divisive prosecutions and 
impunity. He argued that such a commission was necessary “to get to 
the bottom of what happened—and why—to make sure it never 
happens again,” and “to bind up the nation’s wounds” and develop “a 
shared understanding of the failures of the recent past.”241 However, 
this proposal shared with the position of the right wing that 
prosecutions would undermine national unity, and hence should not 
be pursued. 
These debates on the risks of prosecutions are similar to the 
problems often faced by newly elected governments in countries that 
are transitioning from conflict or repression. These fledgling 
transitional regimes must balance an inclination towards asserting the 
rule of law with the pragmatic realities of governance. However, for 
transitional states, disunity often poses a genuine and substantial 
threat of a return to armed conflict or dictatorial rule, and hence, 
amnesties are offered to reduce this risk. However, these concerns do 
not allow “states to sidestep or suspend their fundamental 
obligations” under international law.242 For the United States, disunity 
poses the prospect of difficult legislative battles, rather than violent 
ones. Such political contestations are often a central feature of public 
discourse in democratic states, and there are a wide number of issues 
for which it is unrealistic to expect consensus to be reached. As such, 
the avoidance of contestation does not seem to be a sufficient 
rationale for failing to fulfill America’s international legal 
obligations. 
Furthermore, failing to hold its torturers accountable may actually 
undermine American security. For example, it arguably risks 
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enhancing the credibility of anti-American propaganda, which seeks 
to incite further terrorist attacks on U.S. targets. This argument was 
made by Alberto Mora, a former general counsel for the Navy, who 
contended that “some flag-rank officers believe that Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo constitute ‘the first and second identifiable causes of 
U.S. combat deaths in Iraq’ because they galvanized jihadis.”243 
Similarly, an Air Force major told Harper’s Magazine that “hundreds 
but more likely thousands of American lives [were lost because of] 
the policy decision to introduce the torture and abuse of prisoners.”244 
In addition, by abusing the prisoners within its control, America 
arguably removed the incentive for its enemies to respect the lives of 
captured American military personnel. Furthermore, although U.S. 
counter-insurgency operations are dependent on relations with 
Muslim communities in the United States and abroad, the abuse of 
prisoners may have made these communities less willing to 
cooperate,245 and it reportedly made some foreign governments 
reluctant to share intelligence.246 
D. Amnesty, Mercy, and the Public Welfare 
The sovereign’s prerogative of mercy has been an intrinsic part of 
criminal justice systems around the world for thousands of years. In 
previous centuries, pardons were necessary “to soften the harshness 
and correct the injustice of” relatively rigid bodies of criminal law.247 
Today, however, pardons have a less central role in many criminal 
justice systems, as criminal law has developed to incorporate what 
were previously grounds for pardon (such as insanity and self-
defense) into more flexible systems, and to ensure greater due process 
rights for defendants.248 As a result, pardons have evolved to be 
proclaimed primarily to serve the “public welfare.”249 This is an 
amorphous concept that can encompass pardons granted due to the 
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personal circumstances of the offender.250 Pardons can be used to 
recognize and remedy injustices, such as where individuals have been 
punished for their political or religious beliefs, or alternatively, to 
prevent abuses of the rule of law where offenders are unlikely to 
receive a fair trial. As this section will demonstrate, mercy and the 
public welfare have often been invoked in the proclamation of 
political amnesties and pardons within the United States. 
1. Amnesty as a Recognition of Personal Circumstances 
The personal circumstances of pardon beneficiaries have often 
been used to justify granting mercy for their offenses. For example, 
when President Harding commuted the sentence of socialist activist 
Eugene V. Debs on December 24, 1921, he stated it was because “I 
want him to eat his Christmas dinner with his wife.”251 In 1918, Debs 
had been convicted of sedition under the Espionage Act of 1917 and 
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for making speeches 
denouncing the United States’ participation in World War I. In 
addition, it appears that sympathy for Richard Nixon played a role in 
President Ford’s decision to pardon him, as the proclamation 
describes Nixon as “a man who has already paid the unprecedented 
penalty of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United 
States.”252 In addition, when appearing before the House Justice 
Committee to explain his decision, President Ford stated “it is 
common knowledge that serious allegations and accusations hang like 
a sword over our former President’s head, threatening his health as he 
tries to reshape his life, a great part of which was spent in the service 
of this country and by the mandate of its people.”253 He further 
demonstrated his sympathy by characterizing the Watergate scandal 
as “an American tragedy in which we all have played a part.”254 
Similarly, in pardoning Caspar Weinberger, President Bush Sr. 
noted that he was “pardoning him not just out of compassion or to 
spare a 75-year-old patriot the torment of lengthy and costly legal 
proceedings, but to make it possible for him to receive the honor he 
deserves for his extraordinary service to our country.” The 
proclamation further stated that President Bush could not “ignore the 
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debilitating illnesses faced by Caspar Weinberger and his wife.”255 
This pardon was also extended to five other public officials who had 
been implicated in the Iran-Contra Affair. As with Weinberger, the 
proclamation praised their patriotism and argued that they had each 
“already paid a price—in depleted savings, lost careers, anguished 
families—grossly disproportionate to any misdeeds or errors of 
judgment they may have committed.”256 The pardon proclamation 
also characterized the Iran-Contra affair as “the most thoroughly 
investigated matter of its kind in our history,” thereby rationalizing 
that further investigations were not warranted.257 In the expressed 
motivations for these pardons, the presidents seemed to suggest, in the 
words of President Coolidge, that further application of the penalties 
would produce “no good results,” because either the offenders had 
suffered in other ways for their offenses, or that their offenses should 
be weighed against their previous contribution to American society.258 
2. Amnesty to Address Criminal Justice Deficiencies 
Decisions to grant amnesty or pardon have also been justified on 
the grounds of addressing the deficiencies within the criminal justice 
system. For example, in explaining his rationales for pardoning 
Richard Nixon, President Ford stated that he had been advised that 
“many months and perhaps more years will have to pass before 
Richard Nixon could obtain a fair trial by jury in any jurisdiction of 
the United States under governing decisions of the Supreme Court.”259 
He continued that, were a prosecution to proceed, 
a former President of the United States, instead of enjoying equal 
treatment with any other citizen accused of violating the law, would 
be cruelly and excessively penalized either in preserving the 
presumption of innocence or in obtaining a speedy determination of 
his guilt in order to repay a legal debt to society.260 
 
255 Proclamation No. 6518, supra note 150. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Proclamation: Amnesty and Pardon, 43 Stat. 1940 (Mar. 5, 1924) (proclamation by 
Calvin Coolidge granting pardons to World War I deserters). President Coolidge in 1924 
proclaimed a pardon for World War I deserters. Jones and Raish state that this was a 
partial amnesty that “applied only to persons who had deserted after hostilities had ended 
and before Congress had declared the war to be over.” Douglas W. Jones & David L. 
Raish, Comment, American Deserters and Draft Evaders: Exile, Punishment or Amnesty, 
13 HARV. INT’L L.J. 88, n.250 (1972). 
259 Ford, supra note 209. 
260 Id. 
2012] Power, Pragmatism and Prisoner Abuse: 367 
Amnesty and Accountability in the United States 
The need to intervene in a harsh criminal justice system was also 
invoked by President Clinton to justify his 1999 pardon of sixteen 
members of the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation 
(FALN), an armed movement that opposed U.S. control over Puerto 
Rico.261 The pardoned individuals had been convicted and imprisoned 
for seditious conspiracy relating to the planting of 130 bombs in 
public places across the United States.262 The pardons were deeply 
politically controversial, and both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives passed motions condemning the act of clemency.263 
In justifying his decision, President Clinton stated that “[t]he 
prisoners were serving extremely lengthy sentences—in some cases 
90 years—which were out of proportion to their crimes.”264 
3. Mercy, Fairness, and the “Torture Memos” 
Within contemporary debates on non-prosecution for torture, the 
concept of mercy has not been mentioned explicitly, but the 
justifications given by the Obama administration have resonances 
with the types of mercy outlined above. For example, both President 
Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder have talked of the service 
and patriotism of the U.S. intelligence community, and the need to 
protect their identities so that they can continue their work when 
announcing decisions not to prosecute.265 
The idea of fairness and due process has repeatedly been raised in 
relation to the politicized legal advice given in the torture memos. As 
noted above, section 1004(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
provided that any American officials who were involved in 
interrogations of terrorist suspects would be shielded from 
prosecution when they “did not know that the practices were unlawful 
and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the 
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practices were unlawful.”266 It further stated, in determining whether 
they knew their actions were unlawful, the extent to which they relied 
on the advice from counsel should be taken into account.267 This act 
attempted to create an ignorance or mistake of the law defense that 
assumed that officials implicated in acts of torture were doing so on 
the understanding that their actions were lawful. 
Despite this repudiation of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
legal advice under the Obama administration, the assumption of 
ignorance of the law for past interrogation practices arguably remains 
in place. For example, in June 2011, Eric Holder restated the position 
he had held from 2009 that the Justice Department “would not 
prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the 
legal guidance given by the [OLC] regarding the interrogation of 
detainees.”268 Weiner has argued this decision not to prosecute may 
have been influenced by the view that such persons “would have a 
strong defense to any prosecution under the ‘reasonable reliance’ 
doctrine.”269 Under this doctrine, an accused can invoke the defense 
of ignorance of the law where he or she acted 
in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, 
afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a 
statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or 
judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or 
(iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged 
by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or 
enforcement of the law defining the offense.270 
At face value, this defense would seem to apply to intelligence 
personnel who followed the official interpretation provided by the 
OLC.271 However, this does not take into account that torture is 
prohibited under both domestic and international law. Furthermore, 
under international criminal law, defendants are not permitted to use 
the defense of “superior orders” to escape accountability for actions 
that were “manifestly illegal.”272 Given the severity of acts such as 
waterboarding, which both President Obama and Eric Holder have 
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recognized as torture, such actions could be deemed manifestly 
illegal, and hence ignorance of the law may not be a sufficient 
defense. Furthermore, it is established law that “advice of counsel—
the ‘my lawyer said it was OK defense’—cannot serve as an excuse 
for violating the law,” particularly where the legal advice is 
deliberately designed to provide that excuse.273 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored why the United States has sought to limit 
accountability for prisoner abuse, despite longstanding domestic and 
international prohibitions on torture. Through exploring American 
approaches to amnesty and pardon within the United States and 
abroad, it has argued that American governments have an established 
tradition of using legal clemency to exercise and enhance their power, 
to assert the legitimacy of the state, to justify their policies, to ensure 
compliance with laws, and to control public discourse and the shaping 
of public memory. These findings run counter to theoretical 
assumptions within international law on amnesties in which the 
concept of amnesty is more frequently associated with forgetting, 
rather than memory, and with impunity, rather than encouraging 
lawful behavior. However, what the exploration of American attitudes 
has revealed is that such binary divisions may be overly simplistic, 
and that, instead, the relationship between amnesty and power, the 
rule of law, and memory is much more complex. 
Nations, such as the United States, profit from the stability, 
consistency, and uniformity offered by legal regulation in their 
relationships within each other and with their citizens. These benefits 
have prompted the United States to play a leading role in the 
development of international criminal law and provide considerable 
support to the prosecutions of human rights abusers in other countries. 
However, its adherence to international norms has occurred 
predominantly when they did not conflict with its policy objectives or 
strategic interests. Instead, as this Article has argued, where the 
United States selected to pursue policies that ran counter to 
obligations under domestic or international law, amnesties were 
among the tools used to create exceptions to the law. 
For many offenses under domestic law, creating such exceptions is 
unproblematic. Within the United States, the Supreme Court has 
 
273 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 15, at 694. 
370 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
found that the president’s power to grant amnesties and pardons is 
unlimited, except where it conflicts with the Constitution. At the 
international level, however, torture has been widely accepted to be 
“non-derogable,” which means that states are required to abide by 
their obligations to prohibit torture and investigate allegations of state 
involvement in such crimes even “in time of war, public danger, or 
other emergency that threatens the [state’s] independence or 
security.”274 Furthermore, within certain contexts, systematic and 
widespread torture can constitute a crime against humanity or war 
crime.275 
The United States has often sought to promote individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes under international law committed in 
conflicted or transitional states through its support for international 
tribunals and rule of law programs. In these contexts, transitional 
regimes often face severe legal, political, moral, and practical 
challenges that inhibit their ability or desire to conduct prosecutions. 
However, states’ invocations of these challenges as justifications for 
non-prosecution can trigger international criticism, including from the 
United States. In contrast, although at the time coercive interrogations 
were being conducted the U.S. was engaged in conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the metaphorical “War on Terror,” it 
nonetheless was a consolidated liberal democratic state. As a result, 
pursuing prosecutions for torture, although politically difficult, did 
not threaten the stability of the state, nor risk overburdening non-
existent or corroded legal systems. The United States therefore did 
not face equivalent challenges to fragile and under-resourced 
transitional regimes in pursuing prosecutions. However, similar 
justifications for non-prosecution were used by emphasizing the risk 
posed by prosecutions to national unity, the threats to national 
security, and the need to look forward rather than back. 
Experiences of transitional states such as Spain, Argentina, 
Cambodia, and Bangladesh suggest that the decisions not to prosecute 
are unlikely to close the door permanently on the policy of prisoner 
abuse. The reopening of investigations and limited prosecutions in 
these states, decades after the crimes took place and amnesties had 
been granted, indicates that even where the executive decides not to 
prosecute systematic human rights violations, this rarely ends 
demands for truth and accountability. Instead, over the longer term, 
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the legacy of systematic abuse of prisoners is likely to remain a 
divisive issue within the United States, and one which may require the 
adaptation of existing legal and policy responses. 
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APPENDIX 1 
AMERICAN AMNESTY LAWS AND “POLITICAL” PARDONS, 
1795–PRESENT276 
Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
July 10, 1795 Washington Whisky 
insurrectionists 
(several hundred) 
General pardon to all who 
agreed to thereafter obey 
the law 
 
May 21, 1800 Adams Pennsylvania 
insurrectionists 
Prosecution of participants 
ended; pardon not extended 
to those indicted or 
convicted 
 
Oct. 15, 1807 Jefferson Deserters Given full pardon if they 
surrendered within 4 
months 
 
Feb. 7, 1812 
Oct. 8, 1812 
June 14, 1814 
Madison Deserters 3 proclamations; given full 
pardon if they surrendered 
within 4 months 
 
Feb. 6, 1815 Madison Pirates who fought 
in War of 1812 
Pardoned of all previous 
acts of piracy for which any 
suits, indictments or 
prosecutions were initiated 
 
June 12, 1830 Jackson (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters, with provisions: 
(1) Those in confinement 
returned to duty; (2) those 
at large under sentence of 
death discharged, never 
again to be enlisted 
 
Feb. 14, 1862 Lincoln (War 
Department) 
 
Political prisoners Paroled 
July 17, 1862 
(Confiscation 
Act) 
Congress Rebels President authorized to 
extend pardon and amnesty 
to rebels 
 
 
 
 
 
276 Amnesties laws enacted between 1795 and 1952 are taken from a list in Gregory 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Mar. 10, 1863 Lincoln Deserters Deserters restored to 
regiments without 
punishment, except 
forfeiture of pay during 
absence 
 
Dec. 8, 1863 Lincoln Rebels Full pardon to all 
implicated in or 
participating in the 
“existing rebellion” with 
exceptions and subject to 
oath 
 
Feb. 26, 1864 Lincoln (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters’ sentences 
mitigated, some restored to 
duty 
 
Mar. 26, 1864 Lincoln Certain rebels Clarification of Dec. 8, 
1863, proclamation 
 
Mar. 3, 1865 Congress Deserters Desertion punished by 
forfeiture of citizenship; 
President to pardon all who 
return within 60 days 
 
Mar. 11, 1865 Lincoln Deserters Deserters who returned to 
post in 60 days, as required 
by Congress 
 
May 29, 1865 Johnson Certain rebels of 
Confederate States 
 
Qualified 
July 3, 1866 Johnson (War 
Department) 
Deserters Deserters returned to duty 
without punishment except 
forfeiture of pay. 
 
Jan. 21, 1867 Congress  Sec. 13 of Confiscation Act 
(authority of President to 
grant pardon and amnesty) 
repealed 
 
Sept. 7, 1867 Johnson Rebels Additional amnesty 
including all but certain 
officers of the Confederacy 
on condition of an oath 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
July 4. 1868 Johnson Rebels Full pardon to all 
participants in “the late 
rebellion” except those 
indicted for treason or 
felony 
 
Dec. 25, 1868 Johnson All rebels of 
Confederate States 
 
Universal and 
unconditional 
May 23, 1872 Congress Rebels General amnesty law re-
enfranchised many 
thousands of former rebels 
 
May 24, 1884 Congress Rebels Lifted restrictions on 
former rebels to allow jury 
duty and civil office 
 
Jan. 4, 1893 Harrison Mormons Liability for polygamy 
amnestied 
 
Sept. 25, 1894 Cleveland Mormons Liability for polygamy 
amnestied 
 
Mar. 1896 Congress Rebels Lifted restrictions on 
former rebels to allow 
appointment to military 
commissions 
 
June 8, 1898 Congress Rebels Universal Amnesty Act 
removed all disabilities 
against all former rebels 
 
July 4, 1902 T. Roosevelt Philippine 
insurrectionists 
Full pardon and amnesty to 
all who took an oath 
recognizing “the supreme 
authority of the United 
States of America in the 
Philippine Islands” 
 
June 14, 1917 Wilson  5,000 persons under 
suspended sentence 
because of change in law 
(not war related) 
 
Aug. 21, 1917 Wilson  Clarification of June 14, 
1917, proclamation 
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Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Mar. 5, 1919 Wilson Espionage Commutation of “unduly 
harsh” sentences for 
individuals sentenced for 
espionage during World 
War I 
 
Mar. 5, 1924 Coolidge Deserters More than 100 deserters - 
as to loss of citizenship for 
those deserting since World 
War I armistice 
 
Dec. 23, 1933 F. Roosevelt Espionage and 
deserters 
1,500 convicted of having 
violated espionage or draft 
laws (World War I) who 
had completed their 
sentences 
 
Dec. 24, 1945 Truman  Several thousand ex-
convicts who had served in 
World War II for at least 1 
year 
 
Dec. 23, 1947 Truman Draft evaders 1,523 individual pardons 
for draft evasion in World 
War II, based on 
recommendations of 
President’s Amnesty Board 
 
Dec. 24, 1952 Truman  Ex-convicts who served in 
Armed Forces not less than 
1 year after June 25, 1950 
 
Dec. 24, 1952 Truman Deserters All persons convicted for 
having deserted between 
Aug. 15, 1945, and June 
25, 1950 
 
Sept. 16, 1974 Ford Deserters A limited clemency 
program in 1974 of partial 
relief for war resisters 
 
Sept. 8, 1974 Ford President Richard 
Nixon 
Pardon for former President 
Richard Nixon for 
“offences against the 
United States” 
 
Jan. 21, 1977 Carter Deserters Unconditional pardon for 
draft evasion 
 
 
376 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 307 
Date Issued by Persons Affected Nature of Action 
Dec. 24, 1992 Bush Sr. Six Reagan 
administration 
members 
 
Pardon for involvement in 
Iran-Contra Affair 
Aug. 11, 1999 Clinton Insurgents 16 members of Armed 
Forces of Puerto Rican 
National Liberation 
(FLAN) for violent 
insurgency within the 
United States 
 
